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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear Appellants' appeal. 
Jurisdiction, however, is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Onyx and GLS1 present to this Court four questions on appeal. Restated, they are: 
1. Did the trial court correctly decide that Chris Mahana had a right of possession 
superior to Onyx', when Onyx took his pickup on November 16, 1998? 
2. Was the trial court's award of $11,880 in damages to Mahana for deprived use 
of his pickup (a) based on a measure of damages recognized by law, and (b) 
within the court's broad discretion to determine damages? 
3. Did the trial court correctly decide that Onyx could not set off against its 
liability for damages in conversion a pretrial recovery by Mahana from an 
independent third-party collateral source? 
4. Was the trial court's award of $25,000 in punitive damages (a) properly based 
on Utah law, and (b) within the trial court's discretion? 
ISSUES NOT APPEALED 
Onyx does not appeal the following rulings: 
Appellees will refer to Onyx and GLS, collectively, as "Onyx" and will refer to GLS 
separately, by name, only when the context so requires. 
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1. Onyx does not appeal the court's award of $2,075 plus prejudgment interest to 
Rick Warner Toyota. See Judgment, R. 669; Conclusion of Law Nos. 8-11 R. 636. 
These damages were awarded pursuant to Warner's theory of implied equitable 
indemnity. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green, Inc.. 740 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah 
App. 1987). Theory explained at R. 485-482 and R. 555. 
2. Onyx does not appeal the court's award of $1,045.89 plus interest to Chris 
Mahana for the conversion of personal property that was in his pickup. Appellants' Brief 
at 22 n.10. Even if this court should conclude that Onyx had the right to repossess 
Mahana's vehicle, it did not have the right to take and keep personal property that was in 
it. 
3. Onyx does not challenge the quantum of damages awarded as punitive damages 
($25,000), except to challenge the propriety of any punitive damage award when, 
according to Onyx, there exists "an unsettled question of law." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
According to Appellants, their liability in conversion turns on a single statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-9-103(2)(d)(1953, as amended 1996).2 Although this statute is germane 
to the issue of Onyx' liability, it is not determinative. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-
2Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-103(2)(b) and (2)(d) were repealed effective July 1,2001, 
after this action was filed and tried, as part of the wholesale amendments to Article 9 of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code. These sections, however, govern the outcome of this 
action, as "the substantive law to be applied throughout an action is the law in effect at the 
date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah App. 1998). 
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103(2)(b)(1953, as amended 1996) is determinative. A copy of this statute is reproduced 
in the Addendum attached hereto as Item No. 3. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1 (1953, as amended 1991) is the foundation on which the 
trial court based its award of punitive damages. See Addendum, Item No. 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Onyx accurately summarizes the proceedings in the trial court and resolution of the 
parties' claims, which culminated in a Judgment entered on October 11, 2001. R. 669. 
See Addendum, Item No. 1. Its summation of the facts, however, is incomplete and 
misleading. The trial court entered detailed Findings of Fact. R. 647. See Addendum, 
Item No. 2. The court made these findings only after it laboriously considered Onyx' 
challenge to virtually every proposed finding. R. 618, 631-623, 653-648. Onyx, in 
particular, ignores all facts found by the court that prompted it to award punitive 
damages. 
The Findings made by the trial court reveal that Chris Mahana, then 19 years old, 
purchased a used Mazda pickup from Rick Warner Toyota on December 18, 1995. FF 
21.3 Mahana's purchase was for value, without knowledge of a prior lien held by Onyx. 
FF 21, 25. Mahana, after making a down payment, borrowed the balance remaining from 
Zions Bank, FF 21, and a Utah title was subsequently issued showing Mahana as the 
vehicle's owner and Zions as lienholder. FF 23; Pltf. Trial Exh.13. 
3
"FF" will be used to denote "finding of fact." 
-3-
Unknown to Mahana and to Warner, FF 20, 25, Onyx had financed the purchase of 
the same vehicle by Thomas Hartley in early 1995. It retained a lien to secure Hartley's 
repayment, which was perfected by the notation of Onyx' lien on a certificate of title 
issued by California on March 26, 1995. FF 1, 7; Def. Trial Exh. 32. Very soon after his 
purchase, Hartley stopped making payments and defaulted on his loan. FF 8. Onyx 
unsuccessfully tried to find Hartley and the pickup in California. FF 9. 
Hartley, or perhaps someone else, moved the vehicle from California to Arizona. It 
is unclear exactly when this occurred, but it was sometime before August 24, 1995, when 
Arizona issued a certificate of title to Sonny Nicholas, as owner. Copy at R. 160. The 
title issued to Nicholas showed no lienholder. FF 12. A second Arizona title was issued 
to Mike Fostino which, again, indicated that no lien encumbered the vehicle. FF 14; Pltf. 
Trial Exh. 8; Def. Trial Exh. 41. The pickup and title then passed through two Arizona 
dealers, the latter which sold it through Southwest Auto Auction, Chandler, Arizona to 
Rick Warner Toyota in September 1995. FF 15-16. The Fostino title was delivered to 
Warner, properly endorsed by Fostino and the prior dealers. FF 15, 17. Warner, three 
months after its acquisition, sold the pickup to Mahana. FF 21. Warner applied for a 
certificate of title on Mahana's behalf.4 FF 22; Pltf. Trial Exh. 12. Utah, on February 8, 
4Every motor vehicle dealer has a legal responsibility to apply for title on behalf of 
persons who have purchased vehicles from it. Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-301(l)(a). 
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1996, issued a certificate of title which showed Mahana as owner and Zions Bank as 
lienholder. FF 23; Pltf. Trial Exh. 13. 
Almost three years following Mahana's purchase, Onyx traced the vehicle to 
Arizona5, when it learned of the Arizona title that had been issued to Fostino three years 
before. FF 29. Without any concrete basis to do so, Onyx concluded that Hartley and 
Fostino were the same person. FF 30.6 Onyx hired Renegade Research, a company in 
Alabama, to locate the pickup. Renegade traced it to Utah. It cautioned Onyx that the 
vehicle was registered to a person, Chris Mahana, whose name was different than the 
customer name Onyx had given it. FF 31; Pltf. Trial Exh. 16. 
Three days following Renegade's communication, Onyx directed GLS to take 
Mahana's pickup. FF 35. In so doing, Onyx ignored Renegade's cautionary message. 
FF 31-33. Onyx did not order or attempt to examine the Utah certificate of title, to see 
who it named as owner and lienholder. Testimony of J. Miranda, Transcript 4-03-01 p. 
224-225, 320. Onyx also eschewed repossession by judicial means by, for example, 
seeking a writ of replevin. 
In its Brief, at 12, Onyx states that it "located the vehicle in Arizona." This is 
impossible, as the vehicle was in Utah. The correct statement would be that in early 
November 1998, Onyx ascertained that the vehicle had been in Arizona and titled there three 
years earlier. See FF 28-30. 
Indeed, there is evidence that Onyx assumed that "Chris Mahana" was an alias being 
used by Thomas Hartley. Testimony of J. Miranda, Transcript 4-03-01, p. 223, 226, 245, 
304. 
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On November 16, 1998, almost three years after Mahana's purchase, GLS 
repossessed the pickup at the Home Depot in Lindon, where Mahana worked. FF 35. 
When Mahana asked why his pickup was being taken, GLS' employee, Alvin Losee, told 
Mahana it was because he had defaulted on his loan and owed more than $10,000. 
Mahana explained that he was current on his loan payments, FF 36. Losee replied that he 
was not interested in Mahana's explanation. FF 36. Onyx/GLS also took and did not 
give back items of personal property that were in Mahana's pickup. FF 37-38. 
Having been informed by Zions that it had not repossessed his pickup, Mahana 
demanded that GLS return it. FF 42. Zions called GLS and advised that it held a Utah 
certificate of title, which named it as lienholder. FF 43. GLS relayed both messages to 
Onyx' skip tracer, Caesar Ravenna. FF 43. Warner's sales manager, Larry Terry, called 
Onyx and spoke to Ravenna. Terry explained that Warner had purchased the vehicle at an 
auction in Arizona and that the Arizona title endorsed to Warner showed no lien. Terry 
also told Ravenna that Onyx had no right to take Mahana's truck. FF 44. In receipt of 
the above information and multiple demands for return of the vehicle, Ravenna asked two 
of his supervisors what he should do. Their response was "we will need to move the unit 
immediately" and out of Utah "ASAP." FF 48; Pltf. Trial Exh. 14 at 50-49; Testimony of 
J. Miranda, Transcript 4-03-01 p. 242. 
Onyx contacted a truck transporter, "No Procrastination Joe Boyland," who 
immediately moved the vehicle to Nevada. FF 51, 56; Def. Trial Exh. 77. Onyx might 
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instead have stored the pickup in Utah, at GLS, and made an effort to ascertain the status 
of the title and its lien, but it did not. FF 53. The only reason Onyx gave for not doing so 
and, instead, rushing it out-of-state was that storage would have cost it the sum of $8 a 
day. FF52. 
Once the vehicle was out-of-state, Onyx issued a notice of repossession and intent to 
sell, which it mailed to Hartley's old address in California even though it knew he no 
longer lived there. FF 54; Pltf. Trial Exh. 21. It did not mail notice of sale to Mahana 
and did not correspond with him, even though it knew he claimed ownership and priority, 
and that there was evidence to support his claim. FF 54. Onyx justified its failure to give 
Mahana notice of its sale of the vehicle, as to do so would have disrupted the normal 
operating procedure followed by its employees. FF 55. Onyx also refused to correspond 
with Mahana because it assumed he was Thomas Hartley. Testimony of J. Miranda, 
Transcript 4-03-01 p. 245. 
Although Onyx' business is financing the purchase of motor vehicles and even 
though its portfolio of vehicle loans exceeds $2.5 billion, FF 3-6, Onyx' representative at 
trial incredibly testified that it was Onyx' belief and understanding that its lien, perfected 
in California, gave it the right to track down the pickup and repossess it no matter how 
long it had been removed from California, and no matter what subsequent titles issued by 
other states might show. Testimony of J. Miranda, Transcript 04-03-01, pp. 325-326; 
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Closing Argument, Transcript 4-04-01, p. 84.7 Onyx' position remains that if it could roll 
back history, it would handle its search for the pickup and repossession exactly as it did. 
Testimony of J. Miranda, Transcript 4-03-01, pp. 275-276, 279, 324-326. 
The evidence at trial indicated that Onyx had provided its skip tracers and their 
supervisors with no instruction, guidance or training concerning what to do if they 
ascertained that collateral had been moved and retitled in another state; and it had 
established no procedures to guide its employees in such circumstances. FF 69-71; 
Testimony of J. Miranda, Transcript 4-03-01, pp. 246-247, 252-253. 
Following the trial court's determination in September, 1999 (on the cross-motions 
for summary judgment) that Onyx was liable in conversion, Onyx apparently repurchased 
the vehicle. On April 4, 2000, 18 months after it had been taken, Onyx returned the 
pickup to Mahana. FF 61. The pickup had 10,000 more miles on the odometer than 
when taken, and the interior had been damaged. FF 64. None of Mahana's personal 
property that was in the pickup was ever returned. FF 64. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEES' ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court correctly held Onyx and GLS liable in conversion. By 
November 16, 1998, Onyx had long ago lost its perfected security interest in the pickup it 
7It defies comprehension that a company in the business of financing motor vehicle 
purchases and with a multi-state loan portfolio in excess of $2.5 billion, could not know 
about the "perfection of security interests in multiple state transactions" provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
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took from Chris Mahana. It lost its perfected lien status when the original owner, Thomas 
Hartley, removed the pickup from California to Arizona, the pickup was retitled twice in 
Arizona and once in Utah without notation of Onyx' lien, and four months passed after 
removal from California without Onyx reperfecting its security interest. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-103(2)(b). Onyx ignores Article 9-103(2)(b) and instead argues that § 70A-9-
103(2)(d) did not cause it to lose its perfected security interest. Article 9-103(2)(d) does 
not apply, however, because Onyx had already lost its perfected status by operation of 
Article 9-103(2)(b). To the extent it can be argued that Article 9-103(2)(d) does apply, its 
application to the facts in this case would also protect Chris Mahana against Onyx taking 
his pickup. 
Onyx, without legal authority to do so, took Mahana's pickup and deprived him of 
its use for eighteen months. Consequently, it is liable to Mahana in conversion. 
2. The trial court's award of $11,880 in compensatory damages to Mahana for lost 
use of his pickup was proper. The award of $11,880 was founded on a measure of 
damages recognized by Utah as applicable in cases where an owner of property has been 
deprived of its use; namely rental value. The court awarded a conservative sum as the 
eighteen-month rental value, given the evidence that was before it. Onyx does not now 
articulate, nor did it below, what should be the proper measure of damages if not rental 
value. Onyx articulates no reason why rental value over an eighteen-month period cannot 
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exceed the value of the converted chattel. The award of $11,880 was within the court's 
broad discretion to determine compensatory damages. 
3. The trial court correctly decided that Onyx cannot offset against its liability for 
conversion that sum Mahana received from an independent third-party collateral source. 
The collateral source rule bars this result. The rule also precluded the admission into 
evidence of the collateral recovery. Onyx contends that the collateral source rule does not 
apply where Mahana did not pay the premium to purchase the bond that generated the 
collateral recovery. Onyx' position, however, is contrary to Utah law and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A. 
4. The trial court's award of $25,000 in punitive damages was proper. Onyx 
misrepresents the reason it was assessed punitive damages, claiming that the only reason 
it was punished was that it made the wrong call on what was a close question of law. To 
the contrary, Onyx was assessed punitive damages because the conduct that accompanied 
its taking manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of Chris 
Mahana's rights. The trial court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence 
to support this finding. Onyx does not marshal the evidence that would support this 
finding of fact and, thus, cannot attack it on appeal. 
The trial court decided to award $25,000 following its detailed analysis of the seven 
factors enumerated in the case of Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
-10-
1991). Onyx does not challenge the trial court's application of those factors to the facts 
of this case in determining the quantum of damages to be awarded. 
For all the above reasons, the trial court's award of $25,000 was based on the correct 
legal standard, was within the court's discretion, and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Held that Defendants' Taking of Mahana's Pickup 
Established Conversion. 
The trial court held that Onyx and GLS Recovery did not have the legal right to take 
Chris Mahana's pickup and held that their taking it made them liable in conversion. 
Memo. Decision, R. 259; Order on Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment, R. 272. 
The Decision followed cross-motions for summary judgment based on material facts that 
the parties agreed were not in dispute. The applicable material facts were summarized by 
the court in the course of its September 23, 1999 Memo. Decision, R. 259. 
A. The Trial Court's Legal Analysis. 
Onyx mentions little of the trial court's analysis, by which the court concluded the 
defendants were liable in conversion. The question of whether the trial court erred should 
start with its analysis on the issue, and how it arrived at its holding. The trial court's 
reasoning was as follows: 
The parties agree that disposition of this motion is governed by the 
language of section 70A-9-103(2)(b) and/or (d). The parties 
disagree as to how the sections should be interpreted. 
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Subsection (b) provides that when collateral is moved into a 
new jurisdiction, the perfection of the security interest in the home 
state continues until any new state ('another jurisdiction') issues a 
title (the goods are 'registered') and four months have passed. After 
that time the security interest registered in the original state is 
extinguished unless renewed in the new state, Arrow Ford, Inc. v. 
Western Landscape Construction Co., Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 281, 532 
P.2d 553 at 555 (1975). If this section, alone, is considered in this 
case then Mahana wins because a new certificate of title was issued 
in Arizona and more than four months have passed without any 
renewal of the security interest in either Arizona or Utah. 
Onyx, however, cites the provisions of subsection (d) for 
protection of it's interest. That subsection provides that: 
If goods are brought into this state while a security interest 
therein is perfected in any manner under the law of the 
jurisdiction from which the goods are removed and a 
certificate of title is issued by this state and the certificate 
does not show that the goods are subject to the security 
interest or that they may be subject to security interests not 
shown on the certificate, the security interest is 
subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not 
in the business of selling goods of that kind to the extent 
that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after 
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the 
security interest (Emphasis added). 
Onyx argues that the truck was brought to Utah within the four 
month period under subsection (b) and that the California lien was, 
therefore, still valid when Mahana actually took possession. All 
parties agree that Mahana is 'a buyer of the goods who is not in the 
business of selling goods of that kind' and had no knowledge of the 
security interest of Onyx. Onyx, however, insists that the plain 
language of the statute requires that he give value and take delivery 
after issuance of a clean Utah certificate to receive protection from 
the California lien. Onyx argues, essentially, that the 'jurisdiction 
from which the goods are removed' refers to California. Counsel for 
Onyx concedes that, once four months had passed, a second 
purchaser in Arizona (after Sonny Nicholas) would have taken clear 
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of the Onyx interest. Morever, counsel for Onyx concedes that had 
Mahana sold the truck to another non-dealer purchaser in Utah more 
than four months after August 24, 1995, who then received a second 
Utah title, Onyx would have lost its interest. 
This Court is of the view that the interpretation proposed by 
Onyx unreasonably extends the period for re-perfection and was not 
intended by the drafters of the code. The code was intended to 
provide a system whereby liens and security interests could be made 
"of record" to facilitate the free exchange of goods with confidence 
as to the status of the title of those goods. The security interest that 
was extinguished by the clean title in Arizona, coupled with the 
passage of four months was not revived simply because the next 
purchaser in line happened to be one more state removed. The 
language of subsection (d) "under the law of the jurisdiction from 
which the goods are removed" can only reasonably be taken to mean 
the most immediate removal-in this case from Arizona to Utah. 
There are three non-dealer bona fide purchasers for value in the 
chain of title of this truck. By the time of the repossession, under the 
Onyx view of the statute, the first two could have claimed priority 
but not the third. That is not a sensible or reasonable result and not 
consistent with what this Court perceives to be the purpose of the 
system established by the code. Once the four month period has run 
with a clean title issued and no re-perfection has occurred, all the 
world is entitled to rely on the clean title. 
Onyx had no perfected interest in the State of Arizona, and 
therefore subsection (d) does not apply. Summary judgment in favor 
of the Plaintiff is granted as prayed. 
Memo. Decision, R. 259, 258-255. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-103(2)(b) Established Priority and the Right of 
Possession in Chris Mahana. 
The Mazda pickup had been removed from California to Arizona by no later than 
August 24, 1995, as that was when Arizona issued a certificate of title to Sonny Nicholas. 
The Nicholas title showed no lienholder. A second certificate was issued by Arizona to 
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Mile Fostino, which again indicated no lien against the vehicle. The Utah title issued in 
February 1996, was the third certificate of title issued which did not show Onyx as the 
lienholder. 
Against this backdrop, Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-103(2)(b) gave Chris Mahana's 
ownership interest priority over Onyx' lien, when Onyx repossessed the pickup in mid 
November 1998. That section provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the 
effect of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest are 
governed by the laws, including the conflict of law rules, of the 
jurisdiction issuing the certificate until four months after the goods 
are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are 
registered in another jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond 
surrender of the certificate. After the expiration of that period, the 
goods are not covered by the certificate of title within the meaning of 
this section. [Emphasis added]. 
The language in § 70A-9-103(2)(b) protected Onyx' lien interest for four months 
after Hartley removed the Mazda pickup from California. Onyx, however, lost its 
perfected status once four months lapsed after removal of the pickup from California and 
certificates of title were issued by two other states, to three different purchasers, none of 
which disclosed Onyx' lien. According to Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 
§ 9-103:45 (1985): 
When the goods are brought into the state subject to a title certificate 
that bears the perfecting notation of a security interest, that 
perfection is lost when a certificate of title is obtained in the second 
state. 
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Two cases vividly illustrate the operation of Utah's Subsection 2(b), to Onyx' 
detriment. Both interpreted sections of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted by 
Arizona (through which the Mahana pickup passed) and by South Dakota. The Arizona 
and South Dakota statutes correspond to Utah's § 70A-9-103(2). 
The first case, which the trial court cited, is Arrow Ford, Inc. v. Western Landscape 
Construction Co., 532 P.2d 553 (Ariz. App. 1975). R. 200. In that case, Arrow Ford, a 
Texas dealer, sold a Thunderbird to Ray Wood in September 1971. Wood's purchase was 
financed by Ford Motor Credit ("FMC"). FMC's lien was properly perfected by notation 
on a certificate of title issued by the State of Texas on October 6, 1971. 
Wood, as did Hartley, immediately defaulted on his loan repayment obligation. On 
Wood's default, FMC "recoursed" the paper and assigned its perfected lien interest to 
Arrow Ford. In the meantime, though, Wood had taken the T-Bird to Oklahoma and 
somehow convinced the State of Oklahoma to issue him a certificate of title which 
indicated no lien on the vehicle. 
Wood then took the T-Bird to Arizona, where he sold it to C&C Auto Sales. C&C 
obtained an Arizona certificate of title on October 11, 1971, which showed no lien. In 
November 1971, C&C sold the T-Bird to Frontier Auto Sales which then sold it to 
Western Landscape Construction Co. Arizona then issued a second certificate of title, 
showing Western as the owner and, again, no lien against the T-Bird. 
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Arrow Ford thereafter traced the T-Bird to Arizona and, in March 1972, commenced 
a replevin action against Western. The Court held that Arrow Ford's lien remained 
perfected for four months after the T-Bird was removed from Texas, but lapsed after four 
months where the T-Bird was re-titled once in Oklahoma and twice in Arizona, and none 
of the three certificates of title noted Arrow Ford's or FMC's lien. This was so even 
though the sales to C&C, to Frontier, and to Western occurred within the four-month 
period after removal of the T-Bird from Texas. 
The U.C.C.'s establishment of a four-month period of protection was 
an attempt to insure a definite cut-off period of the determination of 
rights and priorities of liens. Our holding effectively attains that 
goal. At the expiration of the four-month period, either the secured 
party has re-perfected and has priority over subsequent interest 
holders or fails to re-perfect and loses his priority. 
Arrow did not re-perfect its security interest within the four-month 
period. Therefore, we hold that those interests in the collateral 
which were acquired during that four-month period were not subject 
to Arrow's security interest. 
Id at 558. 
The second case is Paccar Financial Corp. v. J.L. Healv Construction Co., 561 
F.Supp. 342 (D.S.D. 1983). R. 193. In Paccar, Earl Lent purchased a Kenworth truck-
tractor, financed by Chicago Kenworth. Chicago Kenworth assigned its security interest 
to Paccar. The State of Indiana issued a certificate of title correctly showing Lent as the 
owner and Paccar as lienholder. 
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Thereafter, Mr. Lent set in motion a series of transactions which ended with South 
Dakota issuing a certificate of title showing Healy Construction Company as the owner 
and no lienholder. Lent began by fraudulently obtaining a "clean" Illinois certificate of 
title, which he then used to sell the tractor-trailer to Nye, a Texas dealer, at half its market 
value. Nye sold it to Jowers, a used truck dealer in El Paso. Jowers sold it to Central 
Truck & Trailer, Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Central sold it to Healy on July 16, 1976. 
Healy then obtained a certificate of title issued by South Dakota on August 13, 1976. 
Healy obtained the South Dakota title by surrendering the endorsed Illinois title (which 
had by then been revoked by Illinois) and a "Texas Dealer's Reassignment of Title" 
which Jowers had signed. 
Paccar traced the tractor-trailer to South Dakota and commenced a replevin action 
against Healy to obtain possession of the tractor-trailer. Relying on South Dakota's 1962 
U.C.C. version of Section 9-103, but noting the clarification provided by the 1972 version 
(which South Dakota had by then adopted; and which is the version that Arizona and 
Utah adopted), the United States District Court concluded: 
Thus, to remain perfected as against Healy, an innocent 
purchaser without notice of Paccar's lien which asserts its interest 
under the South Dakota title, Paccar had to comply with the South 
Dakota law which requires the indication of its security interest on 
the South Dakota certificate. SDCL 57A-9-302(4) (1980). There is 
no dispute that Paccar failed to take any of the steps necessary to 
perfect its security interest either by repossession or by noting its lien 
on the South Dakota certificate. 
Id. at 346. 
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Under §9-103(2)(b) the Indiana certificate governed the 
perfection of security interests in the tractor for a grace period of 
four months after the tractor was removed from Indiana. At the end 
of the four-month period, during which Healy acquired the tractor 
and obtained the South Dakota certificate, the South Dakota 
certificate is deemed to be the only certificate of title which "covers" 
the tractor. Because Paccar failed within that period, or thereafter, to 
re-perfect its security interest under South Dakota law, its perfected 
status expired. Paccar, therefore, is deemed unperfected as against 
Healy, who acquired its title within that period and upon removal, for 
the South Dakota certificate does not indicate Paccar's lien. 
Id at 348. 
The Court holds that because Paccar failed to reperfect its 
security interest in South Dakota, its security interest became 
unperfected under South Dakota law. Therefore, Paccar is not 
entitled to possession of the tractor as against J.L. Healy 
Construction Company, which acquired a superior title to and 
interest in the tractor pursuant to the issuance of the South Dakota 
certificate of title. This Court finds that this interpretation of Section 
9-103 places the risk of loss as between two innocent parties in the 
proper place. Paccar was in the best position to prevent the loss by 
tracing its collateral and protecting its interests under South Dakota 
law, or by insuring itself against a loss. 
Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
Article 9-103(2)(b) protects Mahana, just as it protected Western Landscape and 
Healy. Onyx, in its Brief, completely ignores Section 9-103(2)(b), as it did below. By the 
time Onyx repossessed Mahana's pickup, its security interest had long before become 
unperfected and subordinate to Mahana's subsequently acquired ownership interest. 
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C. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-103(2)(d) Did Not Divest Chris Mahana of His 
Priority Status and Right to Possession. 
The trial court observed that Onyx, while ignoring Subsection (2)(b), invoked 
Subsection (2)(d) in an effort to claim it was nonetheless entitled to repossess Mahana's 
vehicle. According to White & Summers, the U.C.C. counterpart to Utah's 
§ 70A-9-103(2)(d) is intended to resolve who prevails as between an out-of-state 
perfected creditor and an innocent purchaser who has relied on a clean certificate of title. 
According to White & Summers, this Code provision supplies a: 
priority rule . . . to protect the most vulnerable class of purchasers, 
non-professional buyers. These buyers otherwise would have little 
or no protection at all because of the custom in many states not to 
check elsewhere for outstanding liens before issuing a new 
certificate. 
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, §23-19 at 985 (2d. ed. 1980). 
Ouinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest (2d ed. 1991 and 
1999 Supp.) offers the following explanation of Section 9-103(2)(d)'s operation and 
effect: 
(b) The Clean Certificate Rule: 9-103(2)(d). 
Notwithstanding the secured parties' care to see to the proper 
notation of the security interest on the certificate of title and 
notwithstanding the duration of perfection resulting from the issuing 
state rule, it is not only possible but likely, upon a change in location 
of the collateral from one jurisdiction to another, that the debtor will 
acquire a new certificate of title in the host state. Under the best of 
circumstances, this will be done in the full awareness and with the 
cooperation of the original party and will result in a new certificate 
of title bearing a notation of the original security interest. Even 
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where such cooperation is not actively involved, if all goes well, the 
new certificate may still be issued with a notation of the existing 
security interest. Short of that, it may be issued with at least a 
notation to the effect that it "may be subject to security interests not 
shown in the certificate." Failing even that, it will be issued in 
"clean" form with no indication that a security interest is or may be 
outstanding. When such is the case, a sale of the collateral to a buyer 
who is in ignorance of the existing security interest becomes 
possible. In order to protect such a buyer, 9-103(2)(d) renders the 
security interest "subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods 
who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind to the extent 
that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance 
of the certificate Tandl without knowledge of the security interest." 
[Emphasis added]. 
Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest, f 9-
103[A][8][c] at 9-65 (3d ed., 1991). 
The effect of Section 9-103(2)(d) is that, "Innocent purchasers who rely on 
certificates of title without notation of a lien on them . . . are protected." General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rupp, 951 F.2d 283, 285 (10th Cir. 1991). 
The principle stated in Rupp is illustrated by Bank of Nebraska in LaVista v. United 
States, 949 F.2d 262 , 16 U.C.C. Rep.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1991); see also "Editorial 
Commentary" in Quinn, supra, <fl9-103 [A] at S9-18 (1999-1 Cumulative Supplement), see 
Addendum, Item No. 6 and R. 58. In this case, a Nebraska bank had loaned $40,000 
against two trucks as security and its security interest was perfected by the notation of its 
lien on two certificates of title issued by Nebraska. The IRS subsequently levied on the 
trucks in satisfaction of an unpaid tax lien. The IRS knew of the Bank's lien and assured 
the Bank that its forthcoming sale of the trucks would remain subject to the Bank's lien. 
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William Kleinman bought the trucks from the IRS at the sale, with knowledge of the 
Bank's liens. Although the IRS remembered before the sale to tell Kleinman about the 
liens, it forgot to include that information on its certificates of sale. Armed with "clean" 
certificates of sale, Kleinman immediately took the trucks to Virginia, where he registered 
and sold them under clean certificates of title to unsuspecting third persons. As 
summarized by Quinn, "thanks to 103(2)(d), that ended the Bank's security interest," as 
"This provision . . . is designed to favor purchasers of motor vehicles who purchase 
under a clean certificate of title." Id. This protection, it might be added, is without 
reference to the four month period mentioned in subsection 2(b). 
Onyx, all the while ignoring Subsection (2)(b), contends that subsection (2)(d) 
cannot have by November 1998 caused it to lose its perfected security interest as "no 
certificate of title had been issued by 'this state' (i.e., in Utah) since the Utah certificate 
was not issued until February 8, 1996 - some two months after Mahana gave value and 
received delivery of the goods." Appellants' Brief at 17. Consequently Onyx concludes 
that, "Because no certificate of title had been issued in Utah at the time Mahana 
purchased the vehicle, under the clear language of the statute Onyx' previously perfected 
security interest was not subordinated to the interest of Mahana." Id. Onyx' analysis, 
however, is flawed. 
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First, Onyx ignores §70A-9-103(2)(b), by which Onyx' lien became unperfected by 
no later than four months after the vehicle was removed from California and Onyx failed 
to re-perfect. 
Second, Onyx incorrectly uses the date of Mahana's purchase rather than the date of 
its taking to analyze whether it had the right to take the pickup. Any analysis of priority 
must compare rights as of November 16, 1998, the date on which Onyx took the truck. 
Third, as the trial court observed (R. 256), 2(d) cannot establish or preserve priority 
of Onyx' security interest where it had no perfected interest under the law of Arizona, the 
state from which the pickup was "removed" when "brought into this state." The first 
sentence of subsection (2)(d) states: 
If goods are brought into this state while a security interest is 
perfected in any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which 
the goods are removed . . . [Emphasis added]. 
The "goods," the Mazda pickup, were, as the trial court concluded, "removed" to Utah 
from Arizona, not from California. Onyx' lien was not perfected under Arizona law. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §47-9103.B.28 (same as U.C.A. §70A-9-103(2)(b)). The Arizona 
certificates of title issued to Nicholas and to Fostino did not reference Onyx' lien. Onyx, 
thus, lost its priority under A.R.S. § 47-9103.B.2 and/or U.C.A. § 70A-9-103(2)(b) once 
the pickup was titled in Arizona and four months passed after removal from California 
and Onyx failed to re-perfect its lien. It also lost its priority under U.C.A. 
8See Addendum, Item No. 8. 
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§ 70A-9-103(2)(d) when the pickup was sold in Arizona or Utah pursuant to clean title, to 
a buyer "not in the business of selling goods of that kind," who gave value and did not 
know of Onyx' lien. According to Anderson's treatise: 
When the goods are brought into the state subject to a title certificate 
that bears the perfecting notation of a security interest, that 
perfection is lost when a certificate of title is obtained in the second 
state. If the second state requires title certificate notation to 
perfect the security interest and the title certificate in the second 
state does not contain such a notation, there is no perfection of 
the security interest and it is unperfected in the second state. 
The security interest is then "subordinate to the rights of a buyer of 
the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind to 
the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after 
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security 
interest." 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §9-103:459 (1985)(emphasis added). Onyx may 
have lost its priority lien position, pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 47-9103.B.4, on the 
issuance of the Arizona certificate of title to Fostino, although none of the parties to this 
action can be sure if Fostino purchased without knowledge of Onyx' lien. Onyx, 
however, definitely lost its priority when Mahana in December 1995, acquired ownership 
pursuant to a clean Arizona certificate of title. 
Onyx' position requires this Court to pretend that the issuance of certificates of title 
by Arizona did not occur. It makes no sense to argue that Mahana would enjoy the 
benefits of this Uniform Code provision had he resided in Arizona and a third Arizona 
Copy in Addendum as Item No. 7. 
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certificate of title had been issued; but that he is denied protection because he lives in 
Utah - even though he purchased pursuant to a clean surrendered certificate of title. 
Onyx, in fact, conceded that had Mahana resided in Arizona when he purchased his 
pickup, subsection (2)(d) would establish Mahana's priority over Onyx' claimed interest. 
As the trial court concluded, Onyx' analysis predicated on subsection (2)(d) is not 
applicable and "is not sensible or a reasonable result." Section 9-103(2)(d), thus, also 
protected Mahana and established the priority of his ownership right when Onyx took his 
pickup on November 16, 1998. 
Onyx' position also requires this Court to pretend that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-
103(2)(b) and, for that matter, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9103.B.2, did not exist. 
D. The Commercial National Bank Case Does Not Save Onyx. 
Onyx, in its Brief, highlights Commercial National Bank of Shreveport v. 
McWilliams. 606 S.W.2d 363 (Ark. 1980).10 Appellants' Brief at 17-20. In fact, it is the 
only case on which Onyx relies to contend that its California lien perfected in early 1995 
trumped Mahana's subsequent ownership interest and gave it the right, in November 
1998, to repossess its prior collateral. 
Onyx placed equally great reliance on this case below. R. 176, copy of case at 171. 
The Arkansas U.C.C. statute analyzed in McWilliams, contrary to Onyx' representation in 
its Brief, at 18, is the 1962 Uniform Commercial Code version, which pre-dates the 1972 
version adopted by Utah and Arizona. 
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According to Onyx, the Arkansas decision is based "on substantially similar facts" to 
those in this case. Brief at 17. The Court in McWilliams , it is true, found in favor of a 
secured party (as noted by a lien on a certificate of title) versus a subsequent purchaser in 
another state. However, the remainder of the facts in McWilliams are not at all similar to 
those in this case. Its holding, therefore, is not applicable. 
In October 1978, Commercial National Bank ("CNB") filed a replevin action against 
McWilliams, a subsequent purchaser and Arkansas resident, to recover a motorhome it 
had financed. CNB's security interest was perfected by notation of its lien on a certificate 
of title issued by Louisiana. At the time CNB filed its replevin action, no other 
certificates of title had been issued and no certificates of title had changed hands in the 
intervening sales transactions. Sometime during the next year, while the replevin action 
was pending, Louisiana issued a certificate of title that mistakenly omitted reference to 
CNB's lien, which McWilliams then used to obtain a clean Arkansas certificate of title. 
The parties' rights, as the court noted, were established at the time CNB filed its 
replevin action. The issuance by Louisiana and Arkansas of clean certificates of title after 
the replevin action had been filed, therefore, could not assist McWilliams. Nor could 
Subsection (2)(d) save McWilliams as he obviously knew, before issuance of the clean 
certificates of title, that CNB possessed a lien perfected by notation of its lien on a 
Louisiana certificate of title. 
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McWilliams stands for the proposition that parties' rights as to priority are 
established as of when a replevin action is filed and ought not be altered by subsequent 
collateral events. McWilliams, however, does not establish the priority of Onyx' prior 
California lien over Mahana's ownership interest, on November 16, 1998, when it 
directed GLS to take Mahana's pickup. 
E. Absent a Legal Right to Take Mahana's Pickup, Onyx and GLS are Liable 
in Conversion for Taking it. 
Onyx' and GLS' taking of Mahana's vehicle, absent their authority to do so, 
establishes their liability in conversion. "A conversion is an act of willful interference 
with a chattel done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is 
deprived of its use and possession." Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 
179 (Utah 1991) (quoting Mired v. Phillips. 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958)). Although 
conversion "results only from intentional conduct it does not however require conscious 
wrongdoing, but only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods 
inconsistent with the owner's right." Id. 
It follows that one who repossesses personal property under a mistaken belief that he 
has the legal right to do so is nonetheless liable to the owner in conversion. Lake Philgas 
Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993) (wrongful 
repossession of fifth wheel trailer); Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 
(Utah 1982) (wrongful repossession of combine). 
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Onyx had no legal authority to repossess Mahana's pickup. Onyx is therefore liable 
to Mahana in conversion for wrongfully "repossessing" and taking his pickup. The trial 
court ruled correctly and did not err in granting judgment to Chris Mahana on this issue. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding Mahana $11,880 in Damages. 
A. The Trial Court's Legal Analysis. 
For this Court to pass judgment on the trial court's damage award, it is appropriate 
that it first be informed as to the trial court's reasoning. The trial court carefully 
explained the basis of its conclusion in the course of its April 9, 2001 Memorandum 
Decision, which followed the two-day trial on April 3 and 4, 2001. That decision shows 
that the Court carefully deliberated on this issue, before concluding that $11,880 was the 
proper measure of damages. The trial court's reasoning and conclusion on the issue of 
damages was as follows: 
The desired objective in computing damages and fashioning a 
remedy is to evaluate a loss suffered by the most direct and practical 
method that can be employed, Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 Utah 
2d 49,448 P.2d 709 (1968) as cited in Clayton v. Crossroads 
Equipment Company, 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah, 1982). "The measure of 
damages in a conversion action is the value of the property at the 
time of the conversion, plus interest,... However, rules relating to 
the measure of damages are flexible, and 'can be modified in the 
interest of fairness' . . . (Citations omitted). . . . The damages in an 
action for conversion are measured by the sum of money necessary 
to compensate the plaintiff for all actual losses or injuries sustained 
as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong," 
Henderson v. For-Shor Company, 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988). 
Moreover, "a wrongdoer is not entitled to have damages, for which 
he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received or will 
receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent 
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collateral source," Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U.S.F. & G.. 949 P.2d 
337 (Utah, 1997) and DuBois v. Nve. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah, 1978). 
After this Court's Memorandum Decision on September 23, 
1999, the Defendant Onyx Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter 
"Onyx") located and returned the 1994 Mazda truck to Mr. Mahana. 
When the truck was recovered in April 2000, the stereo in the dash 
was damaged and unuseable. The amplifier and speakers behind the 
front seat were gone. The CD's and sunglasses were also missing. 
No other damage to the truck was noted although 10,000 additional 
miles had been placed upon the vehicle. 
There was no credible evidence regarding market value of the 
truck at the time of the conversion and, indeed, use of the market 
value of converted property to determine damages is only 
appropriate when the property is not returned, Henderson, supra. 
However, this Court will endeavor to fairly evaluate the loss suffered 
by Mr. Mahana, without deducting for the collateral benefit provided 
by Rick Warner Toyota since this Court concludes that the collateral 
source rule does apply to the efforts of that company. 
Rental cost for a late model small size pickup truck in 1998 
would have been $45.00 per day or $1,200.00 per month at a 
wholesale rate. Mr. Mahana was without his truck for 18 months. 
Calculated at that rate, damages would be $21,600.00. The Court is 
well aware that Mr. Mahana paid less than $9,000.00 for the truck in 
December of 1995. The quoted rate was for rental from Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car which is the largest car rental company in North 
America. The entire Enterprise fleet, however, is comprised of 
vehicles less than two years old. At the time of the taking this truck, 
it was over three years old. An award of the total retail rental cost 
for a relatively new truck would, in the view of this Court, create an 
inequitable windfall for the Plaintiff: 
The general rule is that in an action for the 
conversion of personal property the plaintiff may recover 
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the fair, reasonable, market value thereof.... Damages 
are not to be based on replacement value. 
Where the market value fails to furnish the true 
measure of damages for the conversion of a chattel, the 
actual damages may be shown by appropriate evidence... 
Where no market value exists, the damages must be 
determined in view of all the circumstances bearing on the 
question. Am.Jur.2d Conversion, section 105. 
Use of interest on the value of the truck might also be 
considered as a measure of damages to be considered in lieu of the 
rental value of the lost asset, 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion section 121 
(1985). As noted above, no evidence of the value of the truck at the 
time of the conversion was presented to the Court. Exhibit 25, 
however, is an exact record of payments made during the relevant 
time to Zions Bank on the loan used to purchase the truck. The 
exhibit shows that from November 1998, through March 2000,18 
payments were made including $799.06 that was applied to interest. 
Mr. Mahana paid $1,000.00 cash as a down payment for the truck in 
1995 and had made regular payments on a five year loan since that 
time. There isn't a necessary connection between the unpaid balance 
of the loan and the value of the truck, particularly where, as occurred 
in this case, several additional charges to the loan were made for 
insurance. 
There was also testimony presented that, whatever the market 
value of the truck may have been, the truck depreciated in value 
during the 18 month period of absence by somewhere between 
$1,500 and $3,000. The $1,500 figure was supplied by an expert 
who deals in wholesale vehicles and the $3,000 came from a retail 
sales manager. It is clear that the truck would have depreciated by 
the same amount whether it had been taken or not since the loss in 
value in either case was attributed to the passage of time. 
Mr. Mahana was provided, by Co-Plaintiff Rick Warner 
Toyota, a succession of cars for use, without charge. Rental from 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car of cars of similar make and model to the cars 
provided would have cost $21.99 per day in 1998. Those cars would 
have been newer than the truck taken. Nevertheless, that rate 
calculated at 18 months would yield a total of $11,880.00. 
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Although Mr. Mahana testified that the value of each of the cars 
provided was about the same as his truck and that he was satisfied 
with the arrangement, he couldn't tow jet skis, haul items for 
personal use or go camping with the cars. There was a sentimental 
value to Mr. Mahana from having a pickup truck as opposed to a car. 
Frankly the Court is cognizant that this 19 year old single male went 
from a pickup truck with equipment with a CD player, amplifier and 
additional speakers to a Dodge Neon. The ride, for him, was just not 
the same. 
Weighing all of these circumstances, the Court concludes that a 
fair measure of damages for the deprivation of the pickup truck from 
Mr. Mahana for 18 months is $11,800.00. The total loss to Mr. 
Mahana would consist of the $11,880.00 plus interest from the date 
the vehicle was returned plus $1,045.89 together with interest on that 
total from November 13, 1998, to the date of payment. 
Memo. Decision, R. 579 at 579-574. 
B. Onyx Does Not Articulate What it Believes Should be the Measure of 
Damages Where it Denied Mahana the Use of His Vehicle. 
When this matter was argued to the trial court following the close of evidence, Onyx 
offered the trial court no guidance as to what should be the applicable measure of 
damages if it was held liable to Mahana in conversion. Closing argument, Transcript 
04-04-01, p. 81-130. To the contrary, Onyx argued that Mahana had no damages, 
primarily because of the substitute vehicles that Rick Warner made available for his use. 
Onyx—quite seriously—argued that Mahana's damages "for loss of use is zero" (Id. p. 
100, line 21); that its taking "preserved the value" of the pickup to Mahana (Id., p. 116); 
and that its conduct and wrongful repossession generated "a windfall" to Mahana (Id. 
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p. 97). It characterized Mahana as a "gold digger" because he had the temerity to seek 
compensation for the lost use of his pickup. Id, p. 100, line 16. 
Even now, Onyx does not articulate what should be the measure of damages where 
its conduct deprived Mahana the use of his pickup for eighteen months. It cites no 
authority or precedence in support of what it maintains should be the appropriate measure 
of damages. Onyx implies that $11,800 is "clearly excessive" because that sum is more 
than it cost Mahana to purchase the pickup. It, however, provides no reason why rental 
value cannot exceed purchase price in a deprivation of use case. See Ben Lomond, Inc. v. 
Campbell 621 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Alaska 1984) and Gregory v. Padilla. 379 P.2d 951, 956 
(Alaska 1963) (both holding that rental value/loss of use damages may exceed the market 
value of the converted chattel). Nor does Onyx explain what impact the purchase price 
should have in limiting damages, utilizing a properly applicable measure of damages. 
This Court should refrain to consider an argument that is not adequately briefed; i.e., one 
which lacks legal analysis and authority to support the argument. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998). An argument that the trial court used the wrong measure 
of damages, rejecting that which Onyx proposed, would present a question of law, and an 
issue for appeal. That, however, is a question and issue that Onyx did not raise below. 
As Onyx did not raise the issue before the trial court, it should not be considered now. 
Campbell Maack & Sessions v. DeBrv. 38 P.3d 984, 2001 UT App 397. 
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C. The Court's Award of Damages for Mahana's Lost Use of His Truck was 
Appropriate and Should Not be Overturned. 
Assuming that this Court affirms that Onyx wrongfully took Mahana's pickup, then 
Mahana is entitled to damages for the deprivation of its use that resulted from Onyx' act. 
Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah App. 1994); Henderson v. 
For-Shor Company, 757 P.2d 465. 470 (Utah App. 1988). Where the defendant . . . 
takes an item of property, there has been a loss of one of the valuable interests, i.e., the 
right to use the property." Henderson, supra at 470. 
The fundamental purpose of compensatory damages, in general, is to place the 
plaintiff in the same position in which he would have been had the tort not been 
committed.11 Lvsenko v. Sawava, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT 58 T 22. The damages awarded 
in a conversion action should be sufficient "to compensate the plaintiff for all actual 
losses or injuries sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong." 
Henderson, supra at 469 (quoting 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion §117 (1985)). The trial court 
correctly noted that, "rules relating to the measure of damages are flexible, and "can be 
modified in the interest of fairness." R. 578; see Jenkins, supra at 1004 (quoting Winters 
v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1978)). "In fixing damages the trial 
court is vested with broad discretion and the award will not be set aside unless it is 
nThis purpose and goal, however, will remain illusory for so long as Utah adheres to 
"the American Rule" in determining whether a plaintiff should be reimbursed the attorneys 
fees he has incurred to establish his claim. 
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manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was 
unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous circumstances." Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1982). 
Onyx' wrongful conduct in taking Mahana's vehicle, and for 18 months declining its 
return, deprived Mahana of its use. That use included the special activities (camping, 
hauling, towing jet skis) for which Mahana had purchased, and used his pickup. 
Testimony of Chris Mahana, 04-03-01 Transcript, pp. 21-22, 44, 70. All the while, 
Mahana's loan obligation to Zions remained and he continued to repay his loan even 
though he did not any longer have his pickup. FF 57-58. This obligation, which Mahana 
honored, curtailed his ability to purchase a replacement pickup. 
Where converted goods are returned, the rental value of the goods for the period of 
deprivation is a recognized measure of compensation. Jenkins, supra; Henderson, supra. 
Rental value on detention of a chattel is recoverable as a measure of damages "even 
though the owner in fact has suffered no harm through the deprivation, as when he . . . 
had a substitute that he used without additional expense to him." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 931 comment b (1979). 
The court's computation of damages for deprivation of use was conservative, in that 
it rejected a higher sum that also could have been supported by the evidence. The award 
of $11,880 to Chris Mahana for deprivation of his vehicle's use has a basis in law, and 
did not exceed the bounds of the court's reasonable discretion in determining the damages 
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"sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong." Its award, thus, 
was not error. 
III. The Court Did Not Misapply the Collateral Source Rule. 
The collateral source rule came before the trial court via Onyx' effort at trial to 
admit into evidence Mahana's pretrial recovery on a bond issued by Merchants Bonding 
Company, which Sonny Nicholas had purchased pursuant to his application for the first 
Arizona certificate of title. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of this evidence on the 
ground that the collateral source rule made it irrelevant and, thus, inadmissable. 
Transcript 4-04-01, pp. 55-57. The court sustained the plaintiffs' objection, but 
nonetheless permitted defendants to proffer information concerning the recoveries so that 
Onyx might preserve and perfect for appeal its argument that the evidence was admissible 
and relevant. The proffer disclosed that Mahana and Onyx had received and divided the 
proceeds of the bond. 
The money Onyx received functioned to offset and mitigate its damages. Not 
content with the receipt of this benefit, Onyx wants to further reduce the damages for 
which it is legally responsible by that sum Mahana received. The collateral source rule, 
however, precludes such a reduction. 
A. The Trial Court's Legal Analysis. 
Again, it is appropriate to first examine the court's reasoning, by which it concluded 
that the collateral source rule precluded Onyx' effort to reduce its damages by the amount 
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of Mahana's recovery from an independent collateral source. The court's reasoning is 
detailed in Memoranda Decisions issued April 9, 2001 (R. 579) and June 20, 2001 (R. 
614). In the first Decision, the court rejected Onyx' argument, noting that Utah has 
adopted the collateral source rule: 
A wrongdoer is not entitled to have damages, for which he is liable, 
reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received or will receive 
compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent 
collateral source, Gibbs M. Smith. Inc. v. U.S.F.& G., 949 P.2d 337 
(Utah, 1997) and DuBois v. Nve. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah, 1978). 
R. 579. Having been asked by Onyx to reconsider the issue, R. 592, the court further 
explained: 
Restatement Second of Torts §920A allows a credit against the 
liability of a tortfeasor for payments made by another subject to the 
same tort liability but not for payments made or benefits conferred 
on the injured party from other sources, "although thev cover all or a 
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable." In this case Mr. 
Mahana received a benefit from co-Plaintiff Rick Warner Toyota in 
the form of cars to drive while he was without his truck. It was also 
proffered that he, along with Defendant Onyx Acceptance Corp., 
recovered on a bond posted in Arizona when an application was 
made for a new title to the truck in question. While Rick Warner 
Toyota may have had potential exposure to a claim from Mr. Mahana 
on a warranty of title theory, that would not have been the same tort 
liability that has been determined to accrue to Onyx Acceptance 
because of the wrongful repossession. Moreover, the bond posted by 
someone previous to Mr. Mahana in the chain of title to the truck is 
plainly collateral to and independent of both Onyx Acceptance, Mr. 
Mahana and Rick Warner. This Court concludes that the collateral 
source rule was properly applied in this case and that evidence of 
payment on the Arizona bond may not be used to reduce the liability 
of the Defendants in this case. 
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R. 614, 613. A copy of the Restatement § 920A is included in the Addendum as Item No. 
5. 
B. Onyx Has Not Appealed the Trial Court's Evidentiary Ruling that 
Evidence of Mahana's Bond Recovery was Irrelevant and Inadmissible. 
Evidence of a tort victim's recovery from a collateral source is inadmissible at trial, 
as its admission and consideration would thwart the collateral source rule. Robinson v. 
All Star Delivery. Inc.. 992 P.2d 969, 1999 UT 109 f 23 n.5. The trial judge, therefore, 
correctly refused to admit, on plaintiffs' objection of relevance, evidence of Mahana's 
collateral recovery on the bond that Sonny Nicholas purchased in August 1995. The 
judge nonetheless permitted Onyx to proffer the evidence, in order to allow it to preserve 
the argument on admissibility for appeal. Onyx has not, however, specifically appealed 
the court's evidentiary ruling. 
C. The Collateral Source Rule Precludes Onyx From Offsetting Against its 
Liability a Partial Recovery by Mahana from an Arizona Surety. 
Utah has adopted the "collateral source rule," which has its origin in the common 
law. Dubois v. Nve. 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) (quoted by trial court in its 4-09-01 
Memo. Decision, R. 579); Suniland Corporation v. Radcliffe. 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978); 
Phillips v. Bennett. 439 P.2d 457 (Utah 1968). 
As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has explained: 
The collateral source rule allows a plaintiff to seek full recovery 
from a tortfeasor even though an independent source has 
compensated the plaintiff in full or in part for the loss. 
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Green v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
This common law rule is articulated and explained in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. §920A(2): 
(2) Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from 
other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, 
although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor 
is liable. 
The Restatement concedes that this may result in "double compensation" to a 
plaintiff, but justifies plaintiff's retention of the collateral benefit without any reduction in 
the damages to be paid by the defendant tortfeasor: 
Payments made or benefits conferred by other sources are known as 
collateral-source benefits. They do not have the effect of reducing 
the recovery against the defendant. The injured party's net loss may 
have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that the 
defendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a double 
compensation for a part of the plaintiffs injury. But it is the position 
of the law that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should 
not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A comment b (emphasis added). According to 
Green, supra, "public policy favors giving the plaintiff a double recovery rather than 
allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy reduced liability simply because the plaintiff received 
compensation from an independent source." 59 F.3d at 1032. That a plaintiff injured by 
the acts of a tortfeasor should be more than fully compensated is not properly the concern 
of the tortfeasor. "The only interest the defendant ought to have is to make sure he does 
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not have to pay twice." Suniland, supra at 849 n.5. Defendants cite Nelson v. 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in 
support of their contention that failure to credit them the amount of Mahana's recovery on 
the Merchants bond will give Mahana an "impermissible windfall." Brief at 22. 
However, Nelson did not in any way involve the collateral source rule.12 
The collateral source rule applies to collateral recoveries on or from "insurance 
policies, whether maintained by the plaintiff or a third party." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 920A comment c(l) (emphasis added). It also applies to employment benefits, 
gratuities, and social legislation benefits received by a plaintiff/victim. Id. "The law does 
not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the 
defendant or a person acting for him." Section 920A, supra comment b. 
D. The Collateral Source Rule is Not Limited in Application to Insurance 
Purchased by the Plaintiff, as Onyx Contends. 
Onyx asserts that, "The rationale behind the [collateral source] rule . . . is sound 
where a plaintiff is compensated by insurance for which the plaintiff paid the premium, 
thereby allocating the right of recovery to the party who paid for it." Brief at 24. This 
benefit-of-the-bargain contract rationale finds no support in Dubois, in the Restatement, 
or in any Utah case law. 
Nelson, 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997), addressed rights arising under the Joint 
Obligations Act. 
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According to the Restatement, the form of the collateral benefit is immaterial. The 
rule is invoked even if the benefit was gratuitously bestowed on the plaintiff. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §920A comment c(3) (1979). It includes, for example, 
gratuitously rendered services. Id (e.g., the use of cars provided Mahana by Rick 
Warner Toyota). 
When the collateral source of recovery is insurance, it matters not that the insurance 
was procured by the plaintiff by payment of a premium, or by a third party (in this case, 
Sonny Nicholas). See Id. comment c(l). A plaintiff, as Onyx observes, may retain the 
benefits of an insurance policy he purchased without a defendant tortfeasor setting off 
against his damages the sum of the insurance recovery. Dubois, supra. It does not 
follow, however, as Onyx argues, that a recovery by Mahana from any other collateral 
source, including insurance for which he did not pay a premium, must inure to Onyx' 
benefit. 
Onyx' interpretation violates the fundamental tenet underlying the collateral source 
rule, that a tortfeasor may not reap the benefit of a victim's collateral recovery. Onyx' 
interpretation would result in an unwarranted reduction of the damages for which it 
otherwise is liable. In effect, it would receive a windfall. 
E. Onyx' "Interpretation" of Gibbs Smith Misrepresents the Holding in That 
Case. 
The Gibbs Smith decision did not limit the application of the collateral source rule in 
the fashion described by Onyx. The case presents an alignment of parties altogether 
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different from that here. Gibbs M. Smith was a publisher which had been entrusted with 
photographic prints from an author, Heinz, which were to be used in the publication of a 
book concerning Frank Lloyd Wright's works. Gibbs Smith contracted the publishing to 
Regent Printing, which outsourced the processing of the photographic plates to an 
overseas company. The overseas company lost the plates. Gibbs Smith compensated 
Heinz $27,000, which was the value of the plates. Regent paid Gibbs Smith $3,000 as a 
partial payment toward the loss. Gibbs Smith then made a claim against its insurer, 
USF&G, for reimbursement of the loss under a business insurance policy it had 
purchased. When USF&G refused the claim, Gibbs Smith filed a lawsuit for breach of 
contract against its insurer. USF&G maintained that its contractual liability, if any, 
should be offset by the $3,000 that Gibbs received from Regent. 
The court in Gibbs Smith briefly discussed the collateral source rule, but concluded 
it was not applicable in that case. Id. at 345. The Court concluded it was difficult to 
apply the collateral source rule where (1) the collateral benefit ($3,000 from Regent) had 
come from a party that was possibly at fault for the loss, rather than from an independent 
source and (2) where the party who claimed the benefit of the collateral payment 
(USF&G) was not a wrongdoer or tortfeasor. The Court merely said that "the collateral 
source rule [was] not helpful" in analyzing the parties' rights under the facts of that case. 
Hence, it analyzed those issues under subrogation principles, id. at 345, which it deemed 
applicable. Contrary to Onyx' distorted summary of the case, Gibbs Smith did not limit 
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in any way the application of the collateral source rule in the case of a plaintiff/injured 
party, who has recovered compensation from a collateral source, versus the tortfeasor 
who caused his injury. 
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Onyx. 
A. The Legal Standard for Awarding Punitive Damages is Established by 
Statute. 
Under Utah law, punitive damages may be awarded when: 
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (emphasis added); see Addendum, Item No. 4. 
The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence based on testimony it 
received at trial, that Onyx' conduct manifested a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward and disregard of Chris Mahana's rights. Memo. Decision (April 9, 2001), R. 579, 
571-570; Memo. Decision (June 20, 2001), R. 614, 613-608; see Findings of Fact Nos. 
29-33, 42-56, 68-72 (R. 647, 644-637) and Conclusions of Law Nos. 14-16, R. 647, 635. 
The trial court's decision to award Mahana $25,000 in punitive damages followed its 
detailed analysis of the seven factors identified for consideration in Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). Memo. Decision (June 20, 2001), R. 614, 612-608. 
Onyx does not challenge the trial court's application of the Crookston factors. 
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B. Onyx Misrepresents the Reason why the Trial Court Imposed Punitive 
Damages. 
According to Onyx, the trial court imposed punitive damages merely because Onyx 
made the wrong decision on an issue that presents a close question of law.13 Brief at 27-
30. This misrepresents the trial court's holding. Rather, the basis was Onyx' knowing 
and reckless indifference toward and disregard of Chris Mahana's rights that surrounded 
(1) its decision to take the pickup and (2) its conduct after it was advised by multiple 
sources that the vehicle may not have been Onyx' to take. By comparison, GLS, although 
liable in conversion, was not assessed punitive damages. 
The trial court explained, as follows, its rationale for awarding punitive damages: 
This Court has determined, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that Onyx Acceptance Corporation is responsible for punitive 
damages because their conduct in this case demonstrated a "knowing 
and indifferent reckless toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
others." This Court interpreted a statute hard to read and understand 
in the first memorandum decision rendered on September 23, 1999. 
The conclusion was that Onyx Acceptance Corporation did not have 
the lien priority it claimed during the repossession and in this 
litigation. That misunderstanding alone, however, is not the basis for 
this Court's determination of liability for punitive damages. There 
was no evidence, at all, that Onyx Acceptance Corporation made any 
attempt to consider or plan what to do when or if this circumstance 
arose. There were no policies or procedures and no specific training 
to non-lawyer supervisors called upon to make decisions. Even more 
serious, however, the corporation was presented with specific 
information that should have warned of a problem. They knew that a 
new Arizona title had been issued. They [k]new a clean Utah title to 
Appellees' position is that the question of priority between Onyx and Mahana on 
November 16, 1998 is not at all a close issue. See Argument No. 1, supra. 
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Mr. Mahana had been issued. They were told of Mr. Mahana's 
status by someone from his family, by his bank and by his dealer. 
The response was to demand 'proof and to proceed at best possible 
speed to get the vehicle out of the State of Utah and sold, with notice 
only to the last known address of the California debtor. The conduct 
for which this Court has concluded punitive damages should be 
assessed is the repossession and sale of the vehicle while deliberately 
ignoring substantial evidence that they should not have proceeded. 
Onyx Acceptance Corporation should be punished because they 
were recklessly indifferent to the rights of Mr. Mahana. 
In summary, Onyx Acceptance is a large company with the 
capacity to cover the damages in this case without significant impact 
upon its overall financial condition. The corporation appears to have 
made little or no attempt to safeguard or otherwise be concerned 
with the rights of individuals such as Mr. Mahana who may end up 
with possession of property the corporation identifies as collateral. 
The corporation had substantial opportunity and warning to 
determine the rights of Mr. Mahana but didn't. Instead, they went 
after the collateral as quickly and aggressively as they could. There 
is a possibility that this conduct will be repeated unless the 
consequence in any one case is not substantial enough to make it 
economically unfeasible to continue the conduct. Based upon these 
factors and the nature of the conduct in this case the Court concludes 
that a punitive damages award of $25,000.00, approximately twice 
the amount of compensatory damages, is a reasonable amount in this 
case. 
Memo. Decision (June 20, 2001), R. 614, 613-608 (emphasis added). 
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C. Onyx Cannot Challenge the Trial Court's Finding That Onyx' Conduct 
Manifested a Knowing and Reckless Indifference as to Mahana's Rights, 
Because it Has Not Marshaled the Evidence that Would Support it. 
The question of whether a tortfeasor's conduct manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward a victim's rights is predominantly a question of fact. It involves, 
first, the determination of the conduct in which the defendant engaged. Second, it 
requires a determination whether such conduct "manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference" to a plaintiff's rights. Both questions are principally questions of fact. See 
e.g.. Gavlordv. Hoar. 165 A.2d 358, 362 (Vt. 1960). They, therefore, should be 
analyzed under Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P., which provides that, "findings of fact . . . 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 
The appellant who wishes to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact 
must marshal the relevant evidence presented at trial that supports the court's findings, 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the trial court, it is insufficient to support the challenged finding. Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). When an appellant fails to 
carry his burden of marshaling the evidence, courts of appeal should "refuse to consider 
the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah App. 1989). 
Onyx makes no effort to marshal that evidence that would support the court's 
Finding No. 72, that: 
-44-
By clear and convincing evidence, Onyx' conduct exhibited a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard for the 
rights of Chris Mahana, Rick Warner Toyota and Zions Bank. 
(R. 637). In Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 
1993), for example, the Utah Court of Appeals refused to consider Valley Bank's 
contention that punitives should not be assessed because it had "acted reasonably, or, at 
worst, negligently in executing on [a] trailer" owned by Lake Philgas. It refused because 
Valley Bank failed to marshal that evidence that would tend to support the trial court's 
finding that Valley Bank's "actions manifested a knowing and reckless indifference 
towards and disregard of the right[s] of [Lake Philgas]." Id. at 959. As Valley Bank did 
not argue that the $25,000 award was excessive, but only that its conduct did not warrant 
punitive damages, the Court of Appeals declined to second-guess the amount of the trial 
court's award. This court, for the same reasons, should respect and uphold the amount of 
the trial court's award. 
Onyx attacks the trial court's award of punitive damages on a false premise; that is, 
that its taking in a "close-call" circumstance is the sole reason it was punished and that its 
taking was, at worst, negligent. Onyx cannot, by so doing, evade its duty and burden to 
marshal that evidence that would support the court's Finding No. 72. Having made no 
attempt to marshal evidence that would tend to support the court's finding, it cannot on 
appeal challenge the court's finding that Onyx' conduct manifested a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward Chris Mahana's rights. 
-45-
D. The Court Acted Within its Discretion in Awarding Mahana $25,000 in 
Punitive Damages. 
Clear precedence exists under Utah law for awarding punitive damages in 
conversion cases. Lake Philgas Service, supra (wrongful execution sale of fifth-wheel 
trailer); Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (wrongful 
repossession of combine); Bost v. Larsen Bros., Inc., 103 Utah 142, 134 P.2d 179 (1943) 
(wrongful retention of automobile). 
It is generally held that punitive damages may be imposed for conversion where the 
tortfeasor's conduct exhibits a willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights. 18 Am.Jur.2d 
Conversion § 114 (1985); Dobbs, Remedies § 5.14 at 411 (1973) (exemplary damages 
may lie where converter is on notice of plaintiff's claim to property and fails to ascertain 
his own legal rights with care); see e.g., Bosworth v. Gulf Coast Dodge, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 
152 (Tex. App. 1994) (punitive damages awarded where defendant refused to return and 
continued to exercise dominion over vehicle, even after it learned that plaintiff was the 
rightful owner, plaintiff demanded its return, and defendant had no right to retain 
possession); Gross v. Kouf, 349 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984) (owner of salvage yard assessed 
punitive damages where he intentionally stripped vehicle and sold it as junk, even after he 
knew of the rightful owner's claim and demand for its return). 
The facts in Lake Philgas bear a striking resemblance to those in this case. In that 
case, Valley Bank took possession, by writ of execution, of a trailer that it thought was 
owned by Bennett, against whom it had a judgment. The trailer, however, was owned by 
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Lake Philgas. Lake Philgas informed Valley Bank that it owned the trailer. Information 
provided by First Security Bank confirmed Lake Philgas to be the owner. Nonetheless, 
and despite the receipt of this information, Valley Bank instructed the sheriff to proceed 
with an execution sale. The trial court held that Valley Bank's conduct "manifested a 
knowing and reckless indifference towards and disregard of, the right of [Lake Philgas], 
for which [Lake Philgas] is entitled to recover punitive damages in the amount of 
$25,000." Lake Philgas. supra. 845 P.2d at 959. 
A punitive damages award of $25,000 is just as appropriate in this case. The trial 
court expressly founded its award of punitive damages on Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1. It 
found by clear and convincing evidence that Onyx' conduct had manifested a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward plaintiffs' rights. FF 72, R. 637. It analyzed in detail 
the seven factors cited by Crookston in reaching its conclusion that an award of $25,000 
was appropriate. R. 612-608. As there is no argument that the court misapplied the 
factors stated in Crookston, the court's award of $25,000 in punitive damages should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the above points and authorities, Appellees ask that the decisions and 
Judgments of the trial court be affirmed. 
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4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801) 277-3445 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS S. MAHANA and RICK WARNER 
TOYOTA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 1 
ONYX ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION 
and GLS RECOVERY, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990400472 
Judge James Taylor 
On September 23, 1999, the Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff Chris Mahana, holding that Defendants were liable to him in tort for conversion. 
Remaining issues of liability, compensatory damages, and Mahana's claim for punitive 
damages was tried April 3 and 4, 2001. Trial was reconvened June 14, 2001 for the limited 
purpose of receiving evidence as to the wealth and financial assets of defendant Onyx 
Acceptance Corporation. 
f>«- a ~»r 
H L £ D 
Fourth Judicial District 
of Utah County, State ot Utah 
Court 
'L/bz& *" Deput 
The holdings of this court following the two phases of trial are explained in a 
Memorandum Decision dated April 9, 2001 and a Memorandum Decision dated June 20, 2001. 
Having received evidence on damages and the remaining issues of liability at trial, and having 
ruled on the issues presented to it, 
THE COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That plaintiff Chris Mahana recover of defendants Onyx Acceptance 
Corporation and GLS Recovery, Inc., jointly and severally, compensatory 
damages for conversion and lost use of his pickup in the amount of $11,880.00 
with prejudgment interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from April 4, 2000 
until entry of this Judgment. 
2. That plaintiff Chris Mahana recover of defendants Onyx Acceptance 
Corporation and GLS Recovery, Inc., jointly and severally, compensatory 
damages for the conversion of personal property other than the pickup in the 
amount of $1,045,89 with prejudgment interest thereon from November 16, 
1998 until entry of this Judgment. 
3. That plaintiff Rick Warner Toyota recover of defendants Onyx Acceptance 
Corporation and GLS Recovery, Inc., jointly and severally, damages in the 
amount of $2,075.00 with prejudgment interest thereon at 10 percent per annum 
from April 4, 2000 until entry of this Judgment. 
4. That plaintiff Chris Mahana recover of Onyx Acceptance Corporation punitive 
damages in the amount of $25,000.00. 
That plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties in this action, recover of Onyx 
Acceptance Corporation and/or GLS Recovery, Inc. costs of court in the sum of 
$1,737.80. 
Interest will accrue on the Judgment entered at the rate of 7.34 percent per 
annum until paid. 
DATED this t/ 
FOU 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [proposed] ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, on the JSfi day of-Scptcmbcr 2001, to the 
following: #&*« 
Evan A. Schmutz, Esq. 
Curtis R. Hussey, Esq. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC. 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH $OUNTY 
FOUrth J u d i C ! l ' o ( ' c t n ~ , •> 
STATE OF UTAH of Utah County, slato ' " ^ ' 
* * * 
CHRIS S. MAHANA and RICK 
WARNER TOYOTA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ONYX ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION 
and GLS RECOVERY, INC., 
Defendants. 
**** J /d- J-M/ y-
1 l^~L 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 990400472 
Judge James Taylor 
or urah 
Deputy 
«^ ^p ^p ^^ ^h ^h ^h 
The Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. based (a) on 
the mutual and undisputed facts stated by parties in reference to their cross-motions for 
summary and partial summary judgment (on liability) and (b) on the evidence and testimony 
received at trial. The trial was held in two stages: April 3 and 4, 2001 and June 14, 2001. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In early 1995, Thomas and Silvia Hartley purchased a 1994 Mazda pickup 
(hereinafter "the pickup") from a dealer in Fontana, California. 
2. The Hartleys' purchase was financed by Onyx Acceptance Corporation. 
3. Onyx is a publicly traded Delaware corporation based in California. It is in the 
business of financing vehicle purchases. It operates in at least 20 states and according to its 
1999 Annual Report to Shareholders, has relationships with more than 7,600 motor vehicle 
dealers. In 1999, Onyx financed and purchased over $1.5 billion in installment or lease 
contracts on motor vehicles. 
4. Onyx' assets exceed $393 million, according to its 1999 Annual Report. 
5. Onyx' net stockholders equity at the end of 1999 exceeded $53 million. 
6. The portfolio of motor vehicle loans that Onyx services exceeds $2.5 billion. 
7. The Hartleys gave to Onyx a security interest in the pickup to secure their 
repayment and other obligations under their installment contract with Onyx. The Onyx lien 
was perfected in California by issuance of a certificate of title on March 26, 1995 listing Onyx 
as a lien holder. 
8. After making a very few payments, the Hartleys stopped making payments and 
defaulted on their obligations to Onyx. 
9. Onyx unsuccessfully tried to find the Hartleys in California and repossess the 
pickup. 
10. At some point after their purchase, the Hartleys removed the pickup to Arizona. 
It is unclear exactly when this occurred, but it was sometime prior to August 24, 1995 when 
the pickup was re-titled in Arizona to Sonny Nicholas. 
11. Onyx did not re-perfect its security interest within four months after the 
Hartleys removed the pickup to Arizona. 
12. On August 24, 1995, the State of Arizona issued a certificate of title on the 
pickup. This certificate of title showed Sonny Nicholas as the owner. It indicated there were 
no liens on the pickup. 
13. At the time of, and as a condition to the issuance of, the Arizona title, Nicholas 
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purchases a Bond issued by Merchants Bonding Company in the amount of $16,275.00. 
14. It appears that Nicholas transferred title to Mike Fostino, as a second certificate 
of title was issued by the State of Arizona on August 29, 1995. This certificate of title showed 
Mike Fostino as the owner. It indicated there were no liens on the pickup. 
15. Endorsements on the back of the Fostino certificate of title indicate that Fostino 
transferred title to an Arizona used car dealer, who transferred title to a second Arizona used 
car dealer (Chadwick Auto Sales), before the pickup was purchased by Rick Warner Toyota. 
16. Rick Warner Toyota, a licensed motor vehicle dealer in Orem, Utah, purchased 
the pickup through Southwest Auto Auction in Chandler, Arizona in September 1995. 
17. Subsequent to purchase Southwest delivered to Warner the second Arizona 
certificate of title, which was endorsed over to Warner. 
18. Warner purchased the pickup in the ordinary course of its business. 
19. Warner reasonably relied on a clean Arizona certificate of title on which the 
Onyx' lien did not appear, in purchasing the pickup and, later, in selling it to Mahana. 
20. Warner did not know that Onyx previously had perfected a lien on the pickup, 
recorded on a California Certificate of Title. Warner did not know the Hartleys, Nicholas or 
Fostino and had no dealings or communications with them. 
21. On December 18, 1995, Warner sold the pickup to Chris Mahana for $8,795. 
The terms were $1,000 cash down with the balanced financed over time by Zions First 
National Bank. 
22. After Warner sold the pickup to Chris Mahana, Warner applied for a Utah 
Certificate of Title and surrendered the Arizona-Fostino Certificate of Title. 
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23. On February 8, 1996, the State of Utah issued a Certificate of Title to Mahana 
which showed Mahana and Oren Shepard (Mahana's grandfather) as owners, with Zions First 
National Bank as the lien-holder. 
24. Shepard cosigned on the Zions loan. However, he claims no ownership interest 
in the pickup. 
25. Mahana did not know Hartley, Nicholas, or Fostino and had no knowledge on 
the vehicle's prior ownership. Mahana did not know Onyx previously had a lien on the 
pickup. 
26. Mahana purchased a CD player, an amplifier and speakers, which he had 
installed in the pickup. The cost of these items was $795.89. 
27. Mahana kept current his loan payments to Zions First National Bank. 
28. Onyx continued to search for Hartley and the pickup through 1998.. 
29. Onyx traced the pickup to Arizona. When Onyx learned that the pickup had 
been re-titled in Arizona, it hired Tucson Recovery Bureau in Arizona to locate and repossess 
it. The company provided Onyx an address for Mike Fostino, which the Court concludes was 
obtained from the Arizona certificate of title that showed Fostino as the owner. 
30. In the course of its efforts to find the pickup, Onyx came to believe that Fostino 
was a name assumed by Thomas Hartley. No evidence was presented that would prove or 
disprove Onyx' speculation on this point. 
31. Onyx retained Renegade Research and Investigation Services, Mobile, Alabama, 
to help it locate Thomas Hartley and the pickup. On November 13, 1998, Renegade 
determined and advised Onyx that it had traced the pickup to Utah and that Utah license plates 
(number 535ZUS) had been issued to "Chris Mehana [sic] or Oren Sfiepard," 1156 S. 900 E., 
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Provo, Utah 84606. Renegade cautioned Onyx as follows: "LOOK AT THE NAME IT IS 
DIFFERENT THAN THE CUST NAME YOU GAVE ME!" 
32. Onyx, based on information it had ascertained and that had been presented to it, 
had substantial reason to doubt the priority and status of its lien. 
33. Notwithstanding Renegade's cautionary message, and without any further effort 
to ascertain the current status of title to the pickup or to determine who had the right to possess 
it, Onyx that same day faxed to GLS Recovery in Orem, Utah a written "Authorization to 
Repossess." The Authorization advised GLS that the pickup was in the possession of a third 
party, "Chris Mehana." The authorization nonetheless directed GLS to pick up the vehicle and 
hold it pending further instructions. 
34. GLS assigned its employee, Alvin Losee, to pick up the vehicle. 
35. On November 16, 1998, Losee located the pickup in the parking lot at 
Mahana's place of employment, Home Depot in Lehi. 
36. Losee first loaded the pickup on a flatbed truck, then went into Home Depot to 
demand the keys from Mahana. Mahana was summoned to the front of the store, where Losee 
informed Mahana that his pickup had been repossessed and demanded the keys to the vehicle. 
When Mahana asked why his pickup was being repossessed, Losee replied that Mahana had 
defaulted on his loan and owed over $10,000. Mahana told Losee he had paid less than 
$10,000 for the pickup and that he was current on his loan payments. Losee replied that he 
was not interested in Mahana's explanation. 
37. In the pickup, among other things, were a case of CDs, a pair of sunglasses that 
cost $150, registration and proof of insurance, and miscellaneous items in the glove 
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compartment. 
38. Among Losee's responsibilities was to inventory personal property found in 
repossessed vehicles. The Court does not believe the claim of Mr. Losee, made at trial, that 
there were absolutely no items of personal property, whatever, in Mahana's pickup when he 
inventoried the contents of the pickup. The aforementioned items, in the pickup when it was 
repossessed, disappeared and were never returned to Mahana. 
39. No one else was present when Losee checked Mahana's pickup for personal 
property. GLS does not require that more than one employee witness or be involved in doing 
an inventory of personal property. 
40. Mahana immediately called Zions and asked why his pickup had been 
repossessed. Zions responded that it had not repossessed the pickup and confirmed that 
Mahana was not in default on its loan. 
41. Mahana, following the conversation with Zions, called police and advised that 
his pickup had been stolen. The police later advised Mahana that GLS had repossessed the 
pickup on instructions by Onyx. Mahana subsequently plead guilty to a charge of filing a false 
police report in Justice Court. 
42. Mahana and his father drove to GLS to request that the pickup be returned. 
They advised GLS that Mahana owned the pickup and had purchased it 3 years before from 
Warner. GLS nonetheless refused to return it, explaining that Onyx had a lien and had given 
it instructions to repossess the pickup. Following a violent confrontation initiated by Mahana's 
father, GLS called the police and had Mahana and his father removed from the premises. 
There was no evidence that Chris Mahana instigated or encouraged his father's reprehensible 
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conduct. 
43. GLS also received a telephone message from Zions, which indicated it held a 
Certificate of Title and that the title showed it as the lien-holder. GLS forwarded this message 
to Onyx in California. The message was handled by Onyx' skip tracer on the Hartley account, 
Caesar Ravenna in California. 
44. Ravenna also received a message from Warner's sales manager, Larry Terry. 
Terry explained that Warner had purchased the vehicle at an auction in Arizona and that the 
Arizona Title endorsed to Warner showed no liens. Terry told Ravenna that Onyx had no 
right to have taken Mahana's pickup. 
45. Ravenna also received a phone message from Mahana's mother, protesting that 
Onyx had no right to take the pickup and threatening to report the vehicle as stolen. 
46. Immediately following repossession Onyx thus received verbal reports from 
three different sources, all of whom indicated that Mahana owned the pickup and that a Utah 
title showed Mahana as the owner and Zions First National Bank (not Onyx) as the lien-holder. 
47. Ravenna contacted Zions Bank and request the branch to fax a copy of the Utah 
Title to Onyx as evidence to confirm the verbal report. Zions did not provide a copy of the 
report before the vehicle was transported from the State and sold. 
48. Ravenna reported the messages from Zions, Warner and Mahana's mother to 
two of his supervisors and asked what to do. Their response was "we will need to move unit 
immediately" and out of Utah "ASAP." 
49. Onyx ignored Mahana's and Warner's demands for immediate return of the 
pickup to Mahana. 
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ignoring substantial evidence that should not have proceeded. 
51. Onyx promptly entrusted the vehicle to a truck transporter who operated under 
the name "No Procrastination Joe Boyland" who moved the vehicle out of the state. 
52. The only reason Onyx offered for immediately removing the vehicle from Utah 
was to avoid paying GLS storage fees of $8 a day. 
53. Onyx made no effort to ascertain the legal status of title and right of 
repossession under the following circumstances: (1) Onyx knew that a new certificate of title 
had been issued in Arizona to a Mike Fostino on which its lien was not recorded; (2) Onyx had 
been cautioned by Renegade that the pickup was licensed in Utah to a Chris Mahana and not 
Hartley; (3) Onyx had received immediately following repossession the messages from Zions , 
Warner and Mahana; and, (4) Onyx had requested but not received documentary evidence of 
Mahana's certificate of title from Zions's Bank. 
54. Onyx issued a notice of repossession and intent to sell, which it mailed to 
Hartley's old address in California, even though it knew he no longer lived there. It provided 
no notice to and did not correspond with Mahana, even though it knew he claimed ownership 
and that there was evidence to support his claim. 
55. The reason Onyx gave for not giving notice to Mahana was that it would disrupt 
the normal operating procedure followed by its employees. 
56. Onyx moved the pickup out of state to Nevada, where it was sold before the end 
of the year. 
57. Onyx' action left Mahana with no vehicle to drive and an unpaid loan with 
Zions. He was also deprived of all his personal property in the pickup. 
58. Notwithstanding that he no longer had the pickup, Mahana continued loan 
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payments to Zions in order to protect his credit. 
59. Immediately following the repossession Warner provided Mahana with a series 
of vehicles to drive without charge which continued throughout the approximate seventeen 
month period that the pickup was out of Mahana's possession. Most of the cars provided were 
intermediate sized passenger cars. All of the cars were from Warner's inventory and were at 
least two model years newer than the 1994 Mazda pickup. 
60. Although the cars provided for Mahana's use satisfied most of his transportation 
needs, there were activities for which he had used the pickup but could not use the cars. 
Mahana did not perceive the cars to be the equivalent of the pickup. Average rental charge for 
a pickup would have been substantially higher than for intermediate-sized cars of like age. 
61. Onyx returned the pickup to Mahana about April 4, 2000, having apparently 
repurchased it. 
62. Warner ceased loaning cars to Mahana when Onyx finally returned the pickup 
to him. 
63. The aggregate depreciated value of the vehicles that Warner loaned to Mahana 
totaled $2,075.00. 
64. When returned to Mahana, the pickup was missing the amplifier and speakers, 
which had been installed behind the back seat. The front of the CD player had been torn off, 
which rendered the CD player inoperable. None of the personal property that had been in the 
pickup, the CDs and the sunglasses, was returned. Additionally, there was over 10,000 more 
miles on the odometer than when Onyx took it on November 16, 1998. 
65. The CDs that were missing from Mahana's truck belonged to a friend, whom 
-9-
to replace the CDs was $100. 
66. The Court finds that the damages approximate to compensate Mahana for the 
loss of his personal property to be as follows: 
$795.89 CD stereo player/amplifier & speakers 
$100.00 Case of CDs 
$150.00 Sunglasses 
$1,045.89 Total 
67. The Court finds that the appropriate measure of damages for Mahana's lost 
use of his pickup from November 16, 1998 until it was returned to Mahana in April 2000 is 
$11,880.00 based upon the Court's finding that rented value for the substitute vehicle provided 
by Warner was $21.99 per day.. 
68. Onyx ordered GLS to repossess Mahana's pickup, moved it out of state, and 
sold it without notice to Mahana while deliberately ignoring substantial evidence that it should 
not have proceeded. 
69. Onyx had provided Caesar Ravenna, its skip tracer, with no instruction, 
training, or guidance on what to do if: 
a) a debtor had taken collateral to another state; 
b) a debtor had sold collateral in another state; 
c) collateral had been re-titled to another person in a foreign state with no 
indication of Onyx' prior lien; or 
d) collateral had been re-titled in multiple states, multiple times, and Onyx' lien 
had disappeared from certificates of title in the process; or 
e) the vehicle had been removed from California for more than four months. 
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70. Notwithstanding the large number of loans it services, Onyx apparently had no 
established procedure to follow if circumstances such as those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph occurred. 
71. Onyx had no policies or procedures and no specific training in place for 
supervisors that would guide them in circumstances such as those that occurred in this case. 
72. By clear and convincing evidence, Onyx' conduct exhibited a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward and a disregard for the rights of Chris Mahana, Rick Warner 
Toyota and Zions Bank. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Conclusions of Law made by this Court were previously set forth in three Memoranda 
Decisions dated September 23, 1999, April 9, 2001, and June 20, 2001, which are 
incorporated herein by reference. In addition, the Court articulates the following conclusions: 
1. Onyx no longer held a perfected lien on the pickup when it authorized GLS to 
take the pickup from Mahana. 
2. Onyx lost its lien after the pickup had been removed from California for more 
than four months and Onyx had not re-perfected its security interest in the foreign states to 
which it had been removed and the foreign states (Arizona and later Utah) issued certificates of 
title that no longer showed Onyx' lien. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103; Arrow Ford, Inc. v. 
Western Landscape Construction Co.. 552 P.2d 553 (Ariz. App. 1995); Paccar Financial 
Corp. v. J.L. Healy Construction Co.. 561 F.Supp. 342 (D.S.D. 1983). 
3. As of November 1998, the date of repossession by Onyx, the security interest in 
the pickup claimed by Onyx was subordinate to the rights of Mahana as the new owner. Utah 
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Code Ann.§70A-9-103(2)(b) &(d). 
4. Onyx and GLS wrongfully took Mahana's pickup and the items of personal 
property inside the pickup when they repossessed it. 
5. Onyx and GLS are liable to Mahana in tort for conversion. See Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equipment Company. 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982). 
6. Onyx and GLS are jointly and severally liable to Chris Mahana in the amount of 
$1,045.89 plus prejudgment interest from November 16, 1998 for conversion of the personal 
property in the pickup when repossessed. 
7. Onyx and GLS are jointly and severally liable to Chris Mahana in the amount of 
$11,880 plus prejudgment interest from the date the vehicle was returned, for conversion and 
Mahana's lost use of the pickup. 
8. The law implies a warranty of title in the connection of the sale of a vehicle, 
such as the sale from Warner to Mahana in December 1995. 
9. As between Warner and Onyx, the court concludes for the reason stated in its 
April 9, 2001 decision that the loss represented by the depreciated value of vehicles Warner 
loaned Mahana should be borne by Onyx. As between Warner and Onyx, Onyx is the more 
culpable party. 
10. Warner has established by a preponderance of the evidence the elements of an 
implied equitable indemnity claim against Onyx. Salt Lake City Sch.Dist. v. Galbraith & 
Green. Inc.. 740 P.2d 284, 2887 (Utah App. 1987). 
11. Warner is entitled to recover from Onyx under the theory of implied equitable 
indemnity the sum of $2,075, plus prejudgment interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from 
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April 4, 2000 until entry of judgment. 
12. The collateral source rule bars any offset in favor of Defendants attributable to a 
collateral recovery on a surety bond issued by Merchants Bonding Company and purchased by 
Sonny Nicholas. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A; Dubois v. Nye. 584 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1982). 
13. The collateral source rule bars any offset in favor of Defendants attributable to 
the value of the benefit bestowed upon Mahana by Warner in loaning him vehicles to drive 
until Onyx returned the pickup. 
14. The evidence is clear and convincing that Onyx engaged in conduct that 
demonstrated a knowing and reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the rights of Chris 
Mahana, Rick Warner Toyota and Zions Bank. 
15. The actions and conduct of Onyx in this case warrant an award of punitive 
damages against it, in Mahana's favor. 
16. Having analyzed the factors enumerated in Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991), the Court concludes that the amount of punitive 
damages appropriate in this case to be $25,000.00. See Memorandum Decision, June 21, 
2001. 
DATED t h i s 5 day of /KJ>^ , 2001. 
Judge J^nes K. laylor ^ / 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 7 
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Mahana v. Onyx 990400472 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 8/9/01 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
Evan A Schmutz 
Curtis R. Hussey 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo. Utah 84604 
Mailed this {U day of vy i-x t\<2001, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
Court Clerk 
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Tab 3 
ADDENDUM, #3 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 70A-9-103 
mobiles for use in the lessee's car rental busi-
ness, was a true lease and not a security 
agreement. LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 
P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Loan secured by Assignment of annuity. 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
applied to transactions involving a loan secured 
by the assignment of a life annuity where the 
documents executed in regard to the loan 
clearly evidenced the lender's intent to create a 
security interest. In Re Durham, 935 F.2d 1160 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Leases as Security 
Agreements and the Effect of a Failure to 
Notify on a Secured Party's Recovery of a Defi-
ciency Judgment: FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-
Printers, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 567. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured 
Transactions §§ 8 et seq., I l l et seq., 123 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transac-
tions §§ 1, 8 to 11. 
70A-9-103. Perfection of security interests in multiple 
state transactions* 
(1) Documents, instruments, and ordinary goods. 
(a) This subsection applies to documents and instruments and to goods 
other than those covered by a certificate of title described in Subsection (2), 
mobile goods described in Subsection (3), and minerals described in 
Subsection (5). 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the 
effect of perfection or nonperfection of a security interest in collateral are 
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the 
last event occurs on which is based the assertion that the security interest 
is perfected or unperfected. 
(c) If the parties to a transaction creating a purchase money security 
interest in goods in one jurisdiction understand at the time that the 
security interest attaches that the goods will be kept in another jurisdic-
tion, then the law of the other jurisdiction governs the perfection and the 
effect of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest from the time 
it attaches until 30 days after the debtor receives possession of the goods 
and thereafter if the goods are taken to the other jurisdiction before the 
end of the 30-day period. 
(d) When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject 
to a security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from 
which the collateral was removed, the security interest remains perfected, 
but if action is required by Part 3 of this chapter to perfect the security 
interest: 
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration of the period of 
perfection in the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the 
Lease as security interest. 
Lease with an option to purchase was in-
tended as a security interest where the consid-
eration to exercise the option was a nominal 
10% of the origin?.1 cost of the property, and 
only 6% of the total lease payments, and at the 
time the option was to be exercised the property 
still had a useful life so as to leave the lessee 
with no sensible alternative but to purchase the 
property. FMA Fin. Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 
R2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
"Preferred vehicle lease agreement," which 
anticipated a series of transactions by which 
the lessor would provide the lessee with auto-
A.L.R. — Secured transactions: priority as 
between statutory landlord's lien and security 
interest perfected in accordance with Uniform 
Commercial Code, 99 A.L.R.3d 1006. 
Applicability of Article 9 of Uniform Commer-
cial Code to assignment of rights under real-
estate sales contract, lease agreement, or mort^ 
gage as collateral for separate transaction, 76 
A.L.R.4th 765. 
339 
70A-9-103 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
collateral is brought into this state, whichever period first expires, the 
security interest becomes unperfected at the end of that period and is 
thereafter deemed to havp been unperfected as against a person who 
became a purchaser after removal; 
(ii) if the action is taken before the expiration of the period specified 
in Subsection (i), the security interest continues perfected thereafter; 
(iii) for the purpose of priority over a buyer of consumer goods as 
provided in Subsection 70A-9-307(2), the period of the effectiveness of 
a filing in the jurisdiction from which the collateral is removed is 
governed by the rules with respect to perfection in Subsections (i) and 
(ii). 
* (2) Certificate of title. 
(a) This subsection applies to goods covered by a certificate of title 
issued under a statute of this state or of another jurisdiction under the law 
of which indication of a security interest on the certificate is required as a 
condition of perfection. 
j ^ (b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the 
effect of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest are governed 
by the laws, including the conflict of law rules, of the jurisdiction issuing 
the certificate until four months after the goods are removed from that 
jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are registered in another 
jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond surrender of the certificate. After 
the expiration of that period, the goods are not covered by the certificate of 
title within the meaning of this section. 
(c) Except with respect to the rights of a buyer described in the next 
paragraph, a security interest, perfected in another jurisdiction otherwise 
than by notation on a certificate of title, in goods brought into this state 
and thereafter covered by a certificate of title issued by this state is subject 
to the rules stated in Subsection (l)(d). 
*jf (d) If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein 
is perfected in any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which 
the goods are removed and a certificate of title is issued by this state and 
the certificate does not show that the goods are subject to the security 
interest or that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the 
certificate, the security interest is subordinate to the rights of a buyer of 
the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind to the 
extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance 
of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest. 
(3) Accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods. 
(a) This subsection applies to accounts, other than an account described 
in Subsection (5) on minerals, and general intangibles, other than 
uncertificated securities, and to goods which are mobile and which are of 
a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction, such as motor vehicles, 
trailers, rolling stock, airplanes, shipping containers, road building and 
construction machinery, and commercial harvesting machinery and the 
like, if the goods are equipment or are inventory leased or held for lease by 
the debtor to others and are not covered by a certificate of title described 
in Subsection (2). 
(b) The law, including the conflict of laws rules, of the jurisdiction in 
which the debtor is located governs the perfection and the effect of 
perfection or nonperfection of the security interest. 
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(c) If, however, the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which is not a part 
of the United States, and which does not provide for perfection of the 
secuiity interest by filing or recording in that jurisdiction, the law of the 
jurisdiction in the United States in which the debtor has its major 
executive office in the United States governs the perfection and the effect 
of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest through filing. In the 
alternative, if the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which is not a part of 
the United States or Canada and the collateral is accounts or general 
intangibles for money due or to become due, the security interest may be 
perfected by notification to the account debtor. As used in this paragraph, 
"United States" includes its territories and possessions and the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. 
(d) A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of business if he has 
one, at his chief executive office if he has more than one place of business, 
otherwise at his residence. If, however, the debtor is a foreign air carrier 
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, it shall be deemed 
located at the designated office of the agent upon whom service of process 
may be made on behalf of the foreign air carrier. 
(e) A security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction of the 
location of the debtor is perfected until the expiration of four months after 
a change of the debtor's location to another jurisdiction, or until perfection 
would have ceased by the law of the first jurisdiction, whichever period 
first expires. Unless perfected in the new jurisdiction before the end of that 
period, it becomes unperfected thereafter and is deemed to have been 
unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser after the change. 
(4) Chattel paper. The rules stated for goods in Subsection (1) apply to a 
possessory security interest in chattel paper. The rules stated for accounts in 
Subsection (3) apply to a nonpossessory security interest in chattel paper, but 
the security interest may not be perfected by notification to the account debtor. 
(5) Minerals. Perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of a 
security interest which is created by a debtor who has an interest in minerals 
or the like, including oil and gas, before extraction and which attaches thereto 
as extracted, or which attaches to an account resulting from the sale thereof at 
the wellhead or minehead are governed by the law, including the conflict of 
laws rules, of the jurisdiction wherein the wellhead or minehead is located. 
(6) Investment property. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (e), during the time that 
a security certificate is located in a jurisdiction, perfection of a security 
interest, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a 
security interest in the certificated security represented thereby are 
governed by the local law of that jurisdiction. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (e), perfection of a 
security interest, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority 
of a security interest in an uncertificated security are governed by the local 
law of the issuer's jurisdiction as specified in Subsection 70A-8-109(4). 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (e), perfection of a 
security interest, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority 
of a security interest in a security entitlement or securities account are 
governed by the local law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction as 
specified in Subsection 70A-8-109(5). 
(d) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (e), perfection of a 
security interest, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority 
341 
70A-9-103 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account are 
governed by the local law of the commodit}' intermediary's jurisdiction. 
The following rules determine a ^commodity intermediary's jurisdiction" 
for purposes of this subjection: 
(i) If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and 
commodity customer specifies that it is governed by the law of a 
particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermedi-
ary's jurisdiction. 
(ii) If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and 
commodity customer does not specify the governing law as provided in 
Subsection (i), but expressly specifies that the commodity account is 
maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is 
the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction. 
(hi) If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and 
commodity customer does not specify a jurisdiction as provided in 
Subsection (i) or (ii), the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction is the 
jurisdiction in which is located the office identified in an account 
statement as the office serving the commodity customer's account. 
(iv) If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and 
commodity customer does not specify a jurisdiction as provided in 
Subsection (i) or (ii) and an account statement does not identify an 
office serving the commodity customer's account as provided in 
Subsection (iii), the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction is the 
jurisdiction in which is located the chief executive office of the 
commodity intermediary, 
(e) Perfection of a security interest by filing, automatic perfection of a 
security interest in investment property granted by a broker or securities 
intermediary, and automatic perfection of a security interest in a commod-
ity contract or commodity account granted by a commodity intermediary 
are governed by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is 
located. The rules in Subsections (3)(c), (d), and (e) apply to security 
interests to which this paragraph applies. 
History: C. 1953,70A-9-103, enacted by L. 
1977, ch . 272, § 9; 1989, ch. 218, § 46; 1996, 
ch . 204, § 59. 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws 
1977,0b 272, § 9 repealed former § 70A-Q-103 
(L. 1965, ch 154, § 9-103), relating to accounts, 
contract rights, general intangibles and equip-
ment relating to another jurisdiction, and in-
coming goods already subject to a security in-
terest, and enacted present § 70A-9-103 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, deleted former 
Subsection (6) relating to uncertified securities, 
added present Subsection (6), and in Subsec-
tion (l)(d)(n) substituted "Subsection" for "sub-
paragraph " 
Federal Law. — The Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, cited in Subsection (3)(d), is found at 49 
U.S C § 1301 et seq 
Cross-References. — Parties' power to 
choose applicable law, § 70A-1-105 
Required filings, § 70A-11-106 
Rolling stock deemed personalty, Utah 
Const , Art XII, Sec 14 
Territorial application of act, § 70A-1-105 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Filing m another state 
Legislative purpose 
"Registered" m another jurisdiction 
"Surrender" of certificate 
Fil ing in another state. 
Creditor perfecting its security interest by 
filing financing statement m Arizona does not 
have a perfected security interest in the state of 
Utah Inter Mt Ass'n of Credit Men v Villager, 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 78-18-1 
Determination of causation — Compensation al-
lowed. 
£Vi \ Causation of radiological injury from a nuclear incident shall be deter-
^*
Wd 'by the trier of fact, taking into account epidemiological studies, 
|8>istical probabilities, and other pertinent medical and scientific evidence, 
info) A claimant under this chapter shall be entitled to full compensation of 
^claimant's radiological injuries if the trier of fact determines that it is more 
Pif 1v than not that such injuries resulted from the nuclear incident. 
fcrfflistory: C. 1953, 78-17-4, enacted by L. 
| $ M i . l 4 3 , § 5 . 
CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Section Section 
H-18-1. Basis for punitive damages 78-18-2. Drug exception. 
awards — Section inapplicable 
to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state. 
178-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award 
with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
jireugfalent con duct* or conduct tkair manifests alEhowihg land reckless^ 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising 
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily 
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol 
and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding 
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general 
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid 
to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15 
, or 78-11-16. 
, .(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
paly after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
* (3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
*he amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
pt attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
&e General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. Applicability. - Laws 1989, ch 237, § 4 
°h. 237, § l; 1991, ch. 6, § 4. provides that the act applies to all claims for 
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Ch. 47 DAMAGES § 920A 
by the fact that the defendant's interference has increased the 
monetary value of the property. On the contrary, if the owner 
has acted reasonably in restoring the property to its original 
condition, he may recover the cost of doing so. (See Illustra-
tion 11). 
Illustrations: 
10. A, at the direction of B, a person who he thought 
was authorized, tears down a dilapidated building of no eco-
nomic value on C's land and erects on the land a substantial 
building. After completion, A learns that B was an exas-
perated neighbor, acting without authority, because the 
dilapidated building was maintained by C solely out of spite 
to his neighbors. C is not entitled to substantial damages 
from A. 
11. A, mistakenly believing that he is entitled to land 
that in fact forms a portion of a garden on B's estate, erects 
a garage on the land, which adds to the market value of the 
property. B is, nevertheless, entitled to recover damages 
for the amount reasonably expended by him in removing the 
garage and restoring the garden, unless this would cause un-
due hardship to A. 
§ 9 2 0 A . Effect of Payments Made to Injured Party 
(1) A payment made by a tortfeasor or by a person act-
ing for him to a person whom he has injured is credited 
against his tort liability, as are payments made by an-
other who is, or believes he is, subject to the same tort 
liability. 
(2) Payments made to or benefits conferred on the in-
jured party from other sources are not credited against 
the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a 
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable. 
Comment: 
a. Payments by or for defendant. If a tort defendant makes 
a payment toward his tort liability, it of course has the effect 
of reducing that liability. This is also true of payments made 
under an insurance policy that is maintained by the defendant, 
whether made under a liability provision or without regard to 
liability, as under a medical-payments clause. This is true also 
of a payment by another tortfeasor of an amount for which he is 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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liable jointly with the defendant or even by one who is not actual-
ly liable to the plaintiff if he is seeking to extinguish or reduce 
the obligation. (See § 885). The rule applies to benefits other 
than cash payments. 
&. Benefits from collateral sources. Payments made or bene-
fits conferred by other sources are known as collateral-source 
benefits. They do not have the effect of reducing the recovery 
against the defendant. The injured party's net loss may have 
been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that the de-
fendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a 
double compensation for a part of the plaintiff's injury. But it 
is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the 
injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall 
for the tortfeasor. If the plaintiff was himself responsible for 
the benefit, as by maintaining his own insurance or by making 
advantageous employment arrangements, the law allows him 
to keep it for himself. If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff 
from a third party or established for him by law, he should not be 
deprived of the advantage that it confers. The law does not dif-
ferentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they 
did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him. One 
way of stating this conclusion is to say that it is the tortfeasor's 
responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes, not 
confined to the net loss that the injured party receives. Com-
pare § 924, Comment c (recovery for harm to earning capacity 
though plaintiff was on vacation), § 914A (recovery for damage 
to earning capacity ordinarily not reduced by amount of income 
tax that was not imposed). 
Perhaps there is an element of punishment of the wrongdoer 
involved. (See § 901). Perhaps also this is regarded as a means 
of helping to make the compensation more nearly compensatory 
to the injured party. (Cf. § 914A, Comment b). 
c. The rule that collateral benefits are not subtracted from 
the plaintiff's recovery applies to the following types of bene-
fits: 
(1) Insurance policies, whether maintained by the plaintiff or 
a third party. Sometimes, as in fire insurance or collision auto-
mobile insurance, the insurance company is subrogated to the 
rights of the third party. This additional reason for keeping the 
tortfeasor's liability alive is not necessary, however, as the rule 
applies to insurance not involving subrogation, such as life or 
health policies. 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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(2) Employment benefits. These may be gratuitous, as in the 
case m which the employer, although not legally required to do 
so, continues to pay the employee's wages during his incapacity. 
They may also be benefits arising out of the employment con-
tract or a union contract. They may be benefits arising by stat-
ute, as in worker's compensation acts or the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. Statutes may subrogate the employer to the 
right of the employee, or create a cause of action other than by 
subrogation. 
(3) Gratuities. This applies to cash gratuities and to the ren-
dering of services. Thus the fact that the doctor did not charge 
for his services or the plaintiff was treated in a veterans hospital 
does not prevent his recovery for the reasonable value of the 
services. 
(4) Social legislation benefits. Social security benefits, wel-
fare payments, pensions under special retirement acts, all are 
subject to the collateral-source rule. 
d. The collateral-source rule is of common law origin and can 
be changed by statute. Changes made are sometimes in statutes 
providing a different method of compensation such as the first-
party insurance involved in certain motor vehicle reparations 
acts. 
§ 921. Provocation 
Compensatory damages are not diminished by the fact 
that the injured person provoked the tortfeasor; but 
the provocation is considered in determining the allow-
ance and amount of punitive damages. 
Comment: 
a. One who intentionally provokes another to commit a 
wrongful act may be barred by his own consent, as when he, for 
the purpose of engaging in a fight, insults another. However, if 
the victim's conduct does not amount to consent, the fact that the 
conduct of the injured person provoked the harm is not a defense 
to compensatory damages. 
As stated in § 908, punitive damages can properly be awarded 
only if the defendant was guilty of outrageous conduct; if this is 
found, the trier of fact has discretion to award punitive dam-
ages. In determining whether the defendant's conduct was out-
rageous and in exercising the discretion as to the award and 
the amount of punitive damages, the provocation for the defend-
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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9-65 SECURED TRANSACTIONS 19-103[A][8][c] 
months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are registered 
in another jurisdiction." It will be cut short, in any event, by surrender of the certificate, "but, in 
any event not beyond surrender of the certificate". 
On expiration of the permitted term "the goods are not covered by the certificate of title within 
me meaning of this section." Reperfection of the security interest, therefore, is in order. 
-The secured party, as a result, is required to police the certificated collateral with a four-month 
grace period provided, and with this period further extended until reregistration provided the creditor 
has not surrendered the certificate. 
The difficult question reperfection presents is that reperfection of the security interest in the 
new host jurisdiction will usually require notation on the new certificate and this will usually require 
the cooperation of others. Aware of this problem, the drafters observe that "[o]ne difficulty is that 
no state's certificate of title law makes any provision by which a foreign security interest may be 
icperfected in that state, without the cooperation of the owner or other person holding the certificate 
in temporarily surrendering the certificate. But that cooperation is not likely to be forthcoming from 
an owner who wrongfully procured the issuance of a new certificate not showing the out-of-state 
security interest, or from a local secured party finding himself in a priority contest with the out-of-
state secured party. The only solution for the out-of-state secured party under present certificate of 
title laws seems to be reperfect by possession, i.e., by repossessing the goods." (Official Comment 
4 to 9-103.) 
[b] The Clean Certificate Rule: 9-103(2)(d) 
Notwithstanding the secured parties' care to see to the proper notation of the security interest 
on the certificate of title and notwithstanding the duration of perfection resulting from the issuing 
state rule, it is not only possible but likely, upon a change in location of the collateral from one 
jurisdiction to another, that the debtor will acquire a new certificate of title in the host state. Under 
the best of circumstances, this will be done in the full awareness and with the cooperation of the 
original party and will result in a new certificate of tide bearing a notation of the original security 
interest. Even where such cooperation is not actively involved, if all goes well, the new certificate 
may still be issued with a notation of the existing security interest. Short of that, it may be issued 
with at least a notation to the effect that it "may be subject to security interests not shown in the 
certificate." Failing even that, it will be issued in "clean" form with no indication that a security 
interest is or may be outstanding. When such is the case, a sale of the collateral to a buyer who is in 
ignorance of the existing security interest becomes possible. In order to protect such a buyer, 9-
103(2)(d) renders the security interest "subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not 
in the business of selling goods of that kind to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of 
the goods after issuance of the certificate [and] without knowledge of the security interest." 
This rule applies whether the goods perfected in some other jurisdiction were perfected by 
notation on the certificate or "otherwise than by notation on the certificate of title" (9-103(2)(c) and 
9-103(2)(d)). 
[c] The Noncertificate vs. Certificate State Problem: 9-103(2)(c) 
It is possible that goods or some type of goods, e.g., a boat, may be subject to a certificate of 
title law in one jurisdiction but not in another. If the original state is noncertificated, the goods, 
since not subject to the certification statute of that state, will follow the rules as to ordinary goods. 
Upon removal to the certificated state, however, the period of perfection will normally expire 
•fter four months (if not shorter) and reperfection will be in order. Since the new host state is a 
certificate of title state, this will call for notation on the certificate of title (9-302(3) and 9-302(4)). 
How this is to be effected and whether it will, in fact, result in a notation on the new certificate 
are open questions. It is certainly possible, however, that the certificate may be issued with neither 
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The creditor's financing statements covered prop-
erty including licenses, accounts receivable, and 
tangible and intangible assets. After the debtor 
filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee con-
tinued to operate the radio stations. In com-
pliance with FCC regulations, the broadcast li-
censes were transferred to the trustee. The 
bankruptcy court authorized the trustee to sell 
the assets of the radio stations. Both the bank 
and the creditor claimed priority regarding the 
proceeds from the sale of the licenses. 
The court held that a secured party may 
hold a properly perfected security interest in pro-
ceeds from an FCC-approved sale of a broad-
casting license. The parties in this case were not 
claiming a security interest in the license, which 
would interfere with any rights or obligations 
existing between the debtor and the FCC. (See 
In re Tak Communications, Inc., 985 F.2d 916 
(1993), 19 U.CC. Rep. 2d 869.) Subject to the 
FCCs approval of the sale, the only concern 
in this case was the priority between private third 
parties regarding their entitlement to the sale pro-
ceeds. The court concluded that the bank had 
the prior perfected security interest in the license 
proceeds because governmental licenses are gen-
erally considered to be "general intangibles'* as 
contemplated by 9-106. In re Thomas Commun-
ications, Inc., 161 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 
1993), 22 U.CC. Rep. 2d 890. 
[14] (new) Partnership Interests 
Illinois. A debtor borrowed money from 
an affiliate of the general partner in order to 
make installment payments on limited partner-
ships he bought and pledged the partnership in-
terests as security for the loan. The affiliate filed 
financing statements listing the partnerships as 
collateral. The debtor subsequently borrowed 
money from creditors and granted them a se-
curity interest in the same partnerships who also 
filed a financing statement. 
The court held that the limited partnership 
interests were "general intangibles" under Article 
9 rather than an "uncertificated security" under 
Article 8 because they are defined as personal 
property. The partnerships were not "of a type 
commonly traded in organized markets," nor 
were they "suitable for trading." 
The limited partnership agreement prohib-
ited assignment or transfer of the interest without 
prior approval of the general partner. The court 
held that the restriction on transfer provisions 
contained in the partnership agreements were not 
prohibited by 9-318(4). The fact that the general 
partner owed the partnership certain duties did 
not transform it into an "account debtor." The 
limited partnership agreement did not prohibit 
the assignment of sums due and therefore did 
not create the type of relationship between the 
parties that would implicate 9-318(4). Ncwcombe 
v. Sundara, 654 N.E.2d (App. Ct. 1995), 28 
U.CC Rep 2d 679. 
UCC § 9-103. Perfection of Security Interests in Multiple State Transactions 
EDITOR'S NOTE: See J 9-103[A][20] and % 9-103[A][21] for 1994 conforming amendments 
resulting from Revised Article 8 and 1995 conforming amendments resulting from Revised 
Article 5. 
f9-103[A] EDITORIAL COMMENTARY 
[8] Goods Covered by a Certificate of Title 
[b] The Clean Certificate Rule: 9-103(2Xd) 
A Nebraska bank loaned $40,000 against two trucks of a local towing company, and the 
bank's security interest in both was fully perfected as required by Article 9 by notations on the 
trucks' certificates of title. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) subsequently levied on both trucks in satisfaction of an 
unpaid IRS tax lien. There was no doubt that the bank's security interest was paramount. This 
was acknowledged by the IRS, which informed the bank of the seizure and assured the bank 
S9-19 SECURED TRANSACTIONS 1 9-103[A][9] 
that its forthcoming auction of the trucks would be made subject to the bank's security interest 
This fact was announced at the auction sale and had been noted in the pre-auction literature 
as well. The trucks went for $5,710.99, and the buyer, Kleinman, was given a certificate of sale 
by the IRS. The certificate of sale, unfortunately, did not note the security interest of the bank. 
Did that matter? Kleinman, after all, had bought in at the auction and had been fully informed 
of the bank's security interest. True enough, but Kleinman had a clean certificate of sale and 
this contained a printed legend that stated that the certificate of sale "shall be notice, when received 
by any public official charged with the registration of title to motor vehicles, of such transfer 
and shall be authority to such official to record the transfer on his books and records in the 
same manner as if the certificate of title to such motor vehicle were transferred or assigned by 
the party holding the same, in lieu of any original or prior certificate, which shall be void, whether 
cancelled or not." 
Armed with the clean certificate of sale, Kleinman took off for Virginia where both trucks 
were registered and sold under clean certificates of title, to unsuspecting third persons. Thanks 
to 9-103(2Xd), that ended the bank's security interest. This provision is designed to favor purchasers 
of motor vehicles who purchase under a clean certificate of title. 
The result was that the bank's security interest had been extinguished and Kleinman the 
wrongdoer was nowhere to be found. Only the IRS remained. The bank sued the IRS as provided 
in 26 U.S.C. § 7426(aXl) (1988) for a "wrongful levy." The hitch was that the statute does not 
define the content of the term "wrongful levy." The IRS, predictably, argued that it did not apply 
in this type of case. The IRS, after all, had done everything right save for the omission of a 
notation of the bank's security interest on the cetificate of sale! If any "wrong" had been done, 
it had been done by Kleinman and not the IRS. A mistake had been made, but hardly a "wrongful 
levy." 
The court did not agree. The omission in the certificate of sale paved the way for issuance 
of a clean certificate of title and the subsequent sale of vehicle severed the bank's security interest 
under 9-103(2Xd). That was enough. The Eighth Circuit, Court of Appeals found the levy "wrongful" 
and the statute violated. All that remained was assessment of damages. 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that while the statute itself did not define "wrongful levy," the 
relevant regulations provided that a levy is wrongful if "the levy or sale pursuant to levy will 
or does effectively destroy or otherwise irreparably injure such person's interest in the property 
which is senior to the Federal tax lien" (26 C.F.R. § 301.7426-l(bXivXd). In light of the operation 
of the Code rules, i.e., 9-103(2Xd), therefore, "the IRS effectively destroyed the bank's interest 
in the trucks and therefore was guilty of a wrongful levy." Bank of Neb. in La Vista v. United 
States, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 204 (8th Cir. 1991). [26 UCCLL 5 (Aug. 1992).] 
[9] Mobile Goods 
A bank proposes to lend money to a debtor in the residential landscaping business. The 
loan is to be secured by the debtor's equipment consisting of "backhoes, loaders, mulch spreader, 
trencher, landscape rakes, vibrator plow, hydro-seeders," and the like. The debtor is located in 
Pennsylvania and normally works in a single county of that state* Luzerne County. Recently, the 
debtor has become involved in projects in other states, including New York, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and Washington, D.C. None of the collateral is used over the road or in a large-scale excavation. 
Instead, it is "trailered or chained onto a flat-bed trailer for movement from one area to another." 
Would you judge the equipment to be "mobile" or "nonmobile"? 
This question matters because the answer controls the proper place for "perfecting" the security 
interest; that is, for the filing of the finance statement. If the equipment is classified as "mobile," 
the place of filing would be controlled by "the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located," 9-
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§ 9-103:42 SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
that was issued for the collateral does not set forth the security 
interest of the secured creditor, his security interest is not perfected 
and therefore has the same status when the goods are taken into a 
second state. In such case, the status of the secured creditor as against 
third persons is governed by UCC § 9-301. 
§ 9-103:43. —Title certificate issued with notation of security 
interest. 
When the first state was a title certificate state and a title certificate 
is obtained therein and such certificate bears a notation of the security 
interest, perfection of the interest is thereby acquired and such perfec-
tion continues in the second state to which the collateral is removed 
"until four months after the goods are removed . . . and thereafter 
until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction but in any event 
not beyond surrender of the certificate."7 
When the title certificate issued in the first state bears the interest 
notation, and the collateral, an automobile, is thereafter sold on a tax 
sale in the second state, the secured creditor prevails over the pur-
chaser at the tax sale where the purchaser had knowledge of the 
security interest, even though the automobile was thereafter registered 
to the buyer in the second state but no title certificate was issued in 
the second state.8 
§ 9-103:44. Second state. No title certificate required or issued. 
When goods subject to a title certificate are brought into a state 
subject to a perfected security interest it may happen that no title 
certificate is issued for the collateral in the second state or that if a 
title certificate is issued it does or does not note the existence of the 
security interest. The perfection based on the certificate of title nota-
tion in the first state continues in the second state as long as there is 
no re-registration in the second state and the original certificate of title 
is not surrendered to the appropriate authority.9 Consequently, the 
security interest of the creditor remains perfected when there is no 
title certificate issued in the second state either because none was 
required by the law of that state10 or none was obtained.11 
§ 9-103:45. —Title certificate issued without notation of security 
interest. 
When the goods are brought into the state subject to a title certifi-
7. UCC § 9-103(2)(b). 10. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v Pate 
m , (1978, Miss) 362 So 2d 1245, 25 UCCRS 
8. Brewton Trading Corp. v Midland gg2 
Bank & Trust Co. (1982) 115 Misc 2d 475, 
454 NYS2d 510, 34 UCCRS 980 1 L S t r i c k C o rP- v Eldo-Craft Boat Co. 
(1979, WD Ark) 479 F Supp 720, 28 
9. UCC § 9-103(2Xb). UCCRS 514. 
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cate that bears the perfecting notation of a security interest, that 
perfection is lost when a certificate of title is obtained in the second 
state.12 If the second state requires title certificate notation to perfect 
the security interest and the title certificate in the second state does 
not contain such a notation, there is no perfection of the security 
interest and it is unperfected in the second state. The security interest 
is then "subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in 
the business of selling goods of that kind to the extent that he gives 
value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate 
and without knowledge of the security interest."13 
§ 9-103:46. —Title certificate issued with notation of security 
interest. 
If the collateral comes into the second state with a security interest 
therein perfected by notation on the title certificate for the collateral, 
that perfection is lost when a new title certificate is issued in the 
second state.14 If the second state is a title certificate state and if the 
title certificate in the second state bears a notation of the security 
interest, the perfection of the security interest in the collateral is 
preserved, although it now exists by virtue of the law of the second 
state. 
The fact that there is the change of law for the basis of the 
perfection does not break the continuity of the original perfection. The 
perfection in the second state has the priority of the perfection that 
had been obtained in the first state.15 
§ 9-103:47. Filing. 
When notation on the title certificate is made the exclusive method 
of perfecting a security interest in the collateral, it follows as a matter 
of definition, that a filing under the Code has no effect. In a few 
instances, filing under the Code is required, in addition to title certifi-
cate notation, in order to perfect a security interest in a motor 
vehicle.16 
E. Collateral Brought From Another State Under 1962 
Code 
1. General principles 
§ 9-103:48. Generally. 
In view of the fact that some states have not adopted the 1972 
12. UCC § 9-103(2)(b). 
13. UCC § 9-103(2)(d). 
14. UCC § 9-103(2)(b). 
15. UCC § 9-103(d)(i), § 9-303(2), see § 9-
303:1, pt 2. 
16. See § 9-103:54. 
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(u) If the action is taken before the expiration of the period specified in 
bdivision (a), the security interest continues perfected thereafter; and 
(c) For the purpose of priority over a buyer of consumer goods (subsection B 
-f § 47-9307), the period of the effectiveness of a filing in the jurisdiction from 
^hich the collateral is removed is governed by the rules with respect to 
perfection in subdivisions (a) and (b). 
jj. Certificate of title: 
1. This subsection applies to goods covered by a certificate of title issued 
under a statute of this state or of another jurisdiction under the law of which 
indication of a security interest on the certificate is required as a condition of 
perfection. 
2. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect 
of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest are governed by the law 
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate 
until four months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and 
thereafter until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but in any event 
nbt beyond surrender of the certificate. After the expiration of that period, the 
goods are not covered by the certificate of title within the meaning of this 
section. 
3. Except with respect to the rights of a buyer described in paragraph 4 of 
this subsection, a security interest, perfected in another jurisdiction otherwise 
than by notation on a certificate of title, in goods brought into this state and 
thereafter covered by a certificate of title issued by this state is subject to the 
rules stated in paragraph 4 of subsection A of this section. 
4. If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is 
perfected in any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods 
are removed and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the certificate 
does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or that they 
may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate, the security 
interest is subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the 
business of selling goods of that kind to the extent that he gives value and 
receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and without 
knowledge of the security interest. 
C Accounts, general intangibles and mobile goods: 
1. This subsection applies to accounts (other than an account described in 
subsection E of this section on minerals) and general intangibles (other than 
uncertificated securities) and to goods which are mobile and which are of a 
type normally used in more than one jurisdiction, such as motor vehicles, 
toilers, rolling stock, airplanes, shipping containers, road building and con-
struction machinery and commercial harvesting machinery and the like, if the 
goods are equipment or are inventory leased or held for lease by the debtor to 
others, and are not covered by a certificate of title described in subsection B of 
*fc section 
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